

From Protest to Political Transition: International Responses to Bangladesh's 2024 Movement in the Context of Emergency Constitutional Law

Md Ali Ashraf¹, Muhammad Mahmudur Rahman², Md. Basirulla³

^{1,2}Department of Political Science, University of Rajshahi, Bangladesh

³Department of Political Science, Varendra University, Bangladesh

Corresponding Author: bosirullah213@gmail.com

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines how other countries reacted to the July 2024 student movement in Bangladesh through the prism of constitutional crisis and emergency rule. The demonstrations that began over the reinstatement of the civil service quota system quickly escalated into a nationwide struggle against the constitutional order, marked by rampant violations of constitutionally guaranteed rights, including the right to life and personal liberty, freedom of assembly and expression, and the right against arbitrary arrest. The state's response, manifested in the overuse of force, mass detentions, and long-term internet bans, in fact, precipitated a de facto constitutional crisis without a declaration of a state of emergency. This study will employ a qualitative research design, using documentary and thematic content analyses of official statements, human rights reports, international media coverage, and policy briefs published between July 2024 and February 2025. The results show a clear split in international reactions: Western democracies and international human rights institutions interpreted the crisis as a problem of constitutionality, the rule of law, and international human rights commitments, whereas regional powers viewed it as a problem of political stability, sovereignty, and non-intervention. The article also suggests that continued international pressure, together with mobilization within the country, contributed greatly to undermining the legitimacy of the existing government and to the formation of the interim government operating under the conditions of constitutional necessity. The place of international responses within the context of constitutional emergency and international human rights law, therefore, allows the study to contribute to comparative constitutionalism studies on how international actors affect constitutional failure and post-crisis state politics.

Introduction

In July of 2024, we saw a significantly high number of student-led strikes in Bangladesh, marking an interesting point in the history of the country over the past few years, doing so due to the introduction of a discredited quota system in the civil

servant sector.¹ The Supreme Court has vindicated the vice-president and reinstated the formula for appointing 30 percent of State employment to the offspring of the veterans (soldiers) of the Liberation War of 1971, an act abolished in 2018.² Although the state has offered this scheme as a means of redressing past injustices, student activists have been highly critical of it as an impediment to merit-based hiring and as a manifestation of structural inequality.³

The movement began with a focus on quota-based reforms in the civil service, but quickly expanded to include broader demands for political responsibility, electoral integrity, and democratic reform.⁴ The government resorted to a decisive action by involving the employment of excessive force that consisted of using live ammunition, the use of arbitrary arrests, and internet blackouts. According to reports published by the end of August, there have been 1,400 fatalities, 22,000 injuries, and 9,000 arrests as a result of the movement, which have been either confirmed or reflected by international rights groups under the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.⁵ It can be noted that the violence has been particularly disastrous to the students and young people with a majority of the victims being children.⁶

Concerns of the international community were rising. The United Nations raised the issue of the disproportionate use of force and demanded an investigation into human rights violations.⁷ As the reports published by Amnesty International show, both lethal and less-lethal weaponry is being used during demonstrations even during a government-imposed internet blockade.⁸ The United States and the Canadian governments have expressed, their support to the Bangladesh government in their attempt to sustain civil liberties and enforce the rule of law. Conversely, along

¹ Rifat Mahmud, “Crisis Management of the Anti-Quota Student Movement in Bangladesh: Governance Capacity in Misery,” *Journal of Developing Societies* 41, no. 4 (December 6, 2025): 445–64, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0169796X251344338>.

² Navine Murshid, “How Bangladeshi Students Toppled a Government,” *Current History* 124, no. 861 (April 1, 2025): 123–28, <https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.2025.124.861.123>.

³ S.M. Ali Reza and Md. Mazhar Uddin Bhuiyan, “Analyzing the Role of Key Stakeholders in the July Uprising 2024 in Bangladesh: Actors and Factors Approach,” *Journal of Political Science* 25 (February 19, 2025): 214–37, <https://doi.org/10.3126/jps.v25i1.75783>.

⁴ Dr. Saeyd Rashed Hasan Chowdury, “The Role of Political Parties in Bangladesh’s July Revolution of 2024: Insights from Sufi Perspectives,” *International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science* 8, no. 11 (2024): 2077–93, <https://doi.org/10.47772/IJRIS.2024.8110166>.

⁵ OHCHR, “UN Human Rights Investigation May Support Accountability for Bangladeshi Student Protests Repression” (Geneva, 2025), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2025/02/un-human-rights-investigation-may-support-accountability-bangladeshi-student>.

⁶ OHCHR, “UN Human Rights Investigation May Support Accountability for Bangladeshi Student Crackdown” (Geneva, 2025), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2025/02/un-human-rights-investigation-may-support-accountability-bangladeshi-student>.

⁷ Wilbert Flinterman, “Challenging the Promises of Institutional Reform to Protect Labor Rights in Bangladesh,” *International Labor Rights Case Law* 10, no. 3 (October 30, 2024): 343–49, <https://doi.org/10.1163/24056901-10030011>.

⁸ Mohammad Ashraful Alam, Prakash Chandra Roy, and Judit Bíró, “Breaking the Chains of Fear: Civil Society’s Role in Defying Autocracy and Shaping Bangladesh’s 2024 July Revolution,” *Civil Szemle* 22, no. 2 (April 20, 2025): 71–96, <https://doi.org/10.62560/csz.2025.02.4>.

the same line of action, responses from countries such as China and India were more reserved or neutral.⁹

The consequences of such reactions became more pronounced following the breakup of the Awami League government in August 2024 and the emergence of an interim government.¹⁰ The current events surrounding the government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, attributable to internal disagreements and external pressures, indicate a significant shift in the nature of Bangladesh's politics. With increased interest in the matter, the international community's role in shaping the post-crisis narrative raises questions about the interplay between local political processes and international involvement.¹¹ The paper explores the international community's responses to the 2024 Bangladesh student movement, highlighting official statements, human rights advocacy, and the political implications that extend beyond it.

Even though various reports, media reports and policy briefs have been used to record the details of the 2024 Bangladesh student movement, the body of knowledge is very disjointed and partial. To begin with, there is the testimony of unlawful use of force, arbitrary arrest, torture, and internet blockages, which the human rights groups, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, substantiate in detail.¹² Nonetheless, these reports are more fact-finding in nature and never provide a systematic comparative study of the diverse international responses. Second, United Nations communiqués and OHCHR inquiries also raise issues of breaches of core rights and demand accountability, yet they do not analyze how various geopolitical actors understood or responded to the crisis. Third, foreign press sources such as The Guardian, BBC, Al Jazeera, and The New York Times provide useful narrative timelines and eyewitness accounts but fail to tie their analyses to broader diplomatic, regional, or legal developments. Fourth, policy briefs like the report of the UK House of Commons Library are collections of statements from international actors, but they are descriptive and lack the connection between these responses and the political transition in Bangladesh or global human rights standards. Lastly, regional opinion articles of publications like The Print, The Diplomat give an insight into strategic and geopolitical reconsiderations, but do not

⁹ John Curtis, "Bangladesh: The Fall of the Hasina Government and Recent Political Developments" (London, 2025), <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10096/>.

¹⁰ Hafiz Muhammad Hassaan, Farzana Bloch, and Muhammad Rashid, "Analyzing the Institutional and Socio-Political Impacts of Sheikh Hasina's Departure on Bangladesh's Democracy," *Bulletin of Business and Economics (BBE)* 13, no. 3 (August 28, 2024): 171–77, <https://doi.org/10.61506/01.00459>.

¹¹ Syed Rizwan Haider Bukhari, Shujat Ali, and Inam Ul Haq, "Realigning Alliances in South Asia: Exploring the Dynamics of Pakistan-Bangladesh Relations in a Post-Hasina Era," *Journal of Regional Studies Review* 4, no. 1 (March 30, 2025): 94–109, <https://doi.org/10.62843/jrsr/2025.4a055>.

¹² Sujit Dutta, "The Bangladesh Uprising and an Uncertain Future," *National Security* 7, no. 4 (March 19, 2025): 273–87, <https://doi.org/10.32381/NS.2024.07.04.3>.

relate them to the human rights aspects of the crisis or the constitutional responsibilities of Bangladesh.¹³

Consequently, no current study integrates human rights reporting, diplomatic responses to these reports, geopolitical interests, and constitutional issues within a single analytical framework. None of the earlier works systematically compares Western democracies, regional states, multilateral institutions, and rights-based NGOs. Notably, none of the studies examine the role of international responses in shaping the political transition in Bangladesh between the fall of the Awami League administration and the establishment of the interim government under Muhammad Yunus. This gap leaves unanswered questions about the connection among external pressure, domestic mobilization, and democratic change in Bangladesh.

This study addresses a research gap by examining the 2024 Bangladeshi student movement, which most prior studies have overlooked, focusing on the transition of power and its political impact on the sustainability of government in Bangladesh. As researched by Sunil Thapa, who analysed the transition of power in Bangladesh following Sheikh Hasina's resignation and the successful political consolidation undertaken by Muhammad Yunus as the interim ruler.¹⁴ Furthermore, Muhammad Rafiqul Islam Talukdar discussed the political paradigm and regime in Bangladesh. This study examined the history of the political regime and paradigm in Bangladesh from independence to the fall of the Hasina regime and revealed that institutional democracy has never been fully implemented.¹⁵ Meanwhile, Mohammad Zainuddin et al. highlight various discriminatory actions that prompted large-scale student-led demonstrations. Zainuddin reveals that the movement's success was due to three key mechanisms: framework alignment, moral shock, and a scale shift, which together gave rise to a protest movement and mass mobilisation for regime change.¹⁶

Previous research has also highlighted human rights analysis, both before and after the Bangladeshi student movement, as studied by Abu Bakar Siddik, who discussed the success of students, intellectuals, and civil society in opening the floodgates of democracy and civil liberties in Bangladesh after the fall of the Hasina regime.¹⁷ The only study that addresses this from a constitutional perspective is Sayed Mohammad Abu Daud's, which examines the constitutionality of the interim regime in Bangladesh following the 2024 Bangladesh student movement. The

¹³ Kamrul Hasan, "Bangladesh 2009–2024: The Return to Authoritarianism Under the Awami League and Its Implications for Political Sustainability," *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences* 15, no. 4 (April 30, 2025), <https://doi.org/10.6007/IJARBS/v15-i4/25282>.

¹⁴ Sunil Thapa, "Realpolitik and the Political Transition in Bangladesh: A South Asian Perspective," *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2025, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5334611>.

¹⁵ Mohammad Rafiqul Islam Talukdar, "Political Regimes and Paradigms in Bangladesh," *Asia-Pacific Social Science Review* 25, no. 2 (June 25, 2025), <https://doi.org/10.59588/2350-8329.1572>.

¹⁶ Mohammad Zainuddin, Emadul Islam, and Ishtiaque Arif, "From Quota Reform to Regime Collapse: Understanding the Anti-Discrimination Movement in Bangladesh," *Social Movement Studies*, May 28, 2025, 1–8, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2025.2512716>.

¹⁷ Abu Bakar Siddik, "Bangladesh's July Revolution: Analyzing the 2024 Movement for Free Speech and Democracy," 2025, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5043479>.

interim government must be declared constitutional, given that Bangladesh is on the brink of collapse and therefore requires a solution-oriented government to lay the foundations for sound governance.¹⁸

Unlike several previous studies, this study provides new insights into the literature on civil resistance and political transition by showing how youth-based movements interact with global accountability structures, how internet blackouts affect human rights documentation, and how competing geopolitical interests shape the international discourse on state violence, using the perspectives of emergency constitutional law and human rights enforcement. Therefore, the novelty of this study lies in its examination of the international response to the Bangladeshi student movement, in the context of upholding constitutional values and guaranteeing human rights during a state of emergency, as well as ensuring that the formation of an interim government can be carried out constitutionally, in accordance with the principles of emergency constitutional law.

Methods

This study employs a qualitative design, combining documentary analysis with a comparative survey of international responses to the 2024 Bangladesh student uprising and the subsequent political transition. The secondary sources used range widely in scope, and include official statements and press releases issued by international bodies, including the United Nations, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, government statements released by key actors, including the United States, Canada, India, China and the European Union, investigative reports published by organizations (including international and domestic) such as The Guardian, BBC and Al Jazeera, and local outlets such as Dhaka Tribune and others, policy briefings and research notes issued by organizations such as UK House of Commons Library, and Observer Research Foundation. To include views of transnational civil society and responses during the crisis in real time, supplementary material was provided in the form of social media records and online activism initiatives. Thematic content analysis has been applied to the data according to the framework provided by Braun and Clarke (2006), with the following four dimensions of human rights discourses, diplomatic positioning, humanitarian interventions, and political implications used to generate codes.¹⁹ This body of themes was then compared across four classifications of international actors, namely Western democracies, regional states, multilateral organizations, and rights-based non-governmental organizations, with the aim of establishing patterns of convergent and divergent tendencies, along with their geopolitical underpinnings. Though the methodological approach adopted in such a way is fully appropriate to the objectives

¹⁸ Sayed Mohammad Abu Daud, "Constitutional Legitimacy of the Interim Government: Analysis on Bangladesh Perspective," *International Journal of Law, Social Science, and Humanities* 1, no. 2 (November 29, 2024): 59–64, <https://doi.org/10.70193/ijlsh.v1i2.156>.

¹⁹ Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, "Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology," *Qualitative Research in Psychology* 3, no. 2 (January 21, 2006): 77–101, <https://doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa>.

of the given study, which was to analyze international involvement in the crisis, it is not devoid of limitations. These include, chief among them, the use of publicly available sources, which could reflect institutional or media bias levels; an omission of primary fieldwork or interviews with the elites that could have added depth and refinement to the analysis; and a temporal hold that, limited to the period between July 2024 and February 2025, prevents the scope and coverage of capturing ever-evolving international responses.

Discussion

The new initiatives, which were lost amid the 2024 student-led quota reforms in Bangladesh, elicited a strong response from the international community. Other countries, both powerful and weak, have greatly criticized the acts of high-handedness, mass arrests, and violation of fundamental liberties witnessed during the demonstrations.

The United Nations was quick to demand that the Government of Bangladesh take measures through transparent and credible inquiries into all cases of violence.²⁰ Stressing that it is crucial to foster an enabling environment of dialogue and peaceful solutions of conflicts and issues, Spokesperson of the UN Secretary-General Stéphane Dujarric emphasized the necessity to allow speaking on its own.²¹ According to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, who strongly criticized the overuse of force and arbitrary detentions, full internet access is vital for transparency and communication and should be restored.²²

An international human rights group has been significant in documenting the abuses in detail. The unlawful use of violence was an increasingly prominent feature of the six-day internet blackout highlighted by Amnesty International, also significantly to the detriment of the possibility of independent monitoring of the situation.²³ The outcomes of their studies reveal the use of not only deadly, but also less-lethal weapons by the security officials when responding to non-violent student violence. Human Rights Watch has expressed major apprehensions, and this has

²⁰ MD. Nasir Uddin, "Prisoner Snatching and Intelligence Failures in Bangladesh: A Case Study in Vulnerability," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, June 23, 2025, 1–34, <https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2025.2505099>.

²¹ Kate Gibson and Bonnie Johnston, "Acquitted, Released, and Homeless: The Crisis of Stateless Former Defendants," in *Research Handbook On The Punishment Of Atrocity Crimes* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2024), 283–303, <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781035312917.00022>.

²² Annalisa Ciampi et al., "International Human Rights Law," in *Public International Law* (London: Routledge, 2024), 531–614, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003451327-24>.

²³ Pranto Kumar Sarker, Maruf Ahmed, and Md. Zahidul Islam, "Police Accountability in Criminal Investigation: USA and Bangladesh," *Journal of Asian and African Social Science and Humanities* 10, no. 4 (January 4, 2025): 1–23, <https://doi.org/10.55327/jaash.v10i4.354>.

resulted from a lingering tendency of repression by the Bangladeshi law enforcement that has been extended to peaceful student protestors.²⁴

The responses of other governments worldwide were mixed, but most called for moderation and adherence to human rights principles. The United States emphasized that all parties should exercise restraint and noted the importance of ensuring that due legal process is observed when individuals are arrested. The High Commission of Canada in Dhaka has also made clear that it is highly concerned about the violence to which peaceful demonstrators have been subjected and has demanded the prompt resumption of internet services. Conversely, China reiterated its commitment to non-interference, demonstrating confidence in the semi-autonomous country's sovereign decision-making and handling of its own affairs. India expressed hope that it would soon restore normalcy, but assured that its messages would be careful and sensible.

Background of the Quota Reform Movement

The quota system in Bangladesh's civil service has attracted considerable debate, with equality, meritocracy, and the state's supportive role as central themes. The reason that the system was founded originally was to create representation of underrepresented groups, like ethnic minorities, women, and people whose relatives were freedom fighters. In this organization of the division of government positions, up to 56 percent of positions were reserved in different categories, where the descendants of those who participated in the 1971 Liberation War were particularly reserved 30 percent.²⁵ To achieve the objective of addressing historical grievances, one should acknowledge the meritorious arguments raised by some opponents, who fear that the system may unintentionally affect merit-based recruitment and exacerbate existing social stratifications.²⁶

Following the famous student protests in 2018, the administration, led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, decided to eliminate quotas for first- and second-class public service positions. There was a significant measurement of support to this decision amongst students and civil society but there still remained some doubt as to the immediate application of the decision.²⁷ The 30-percent quota of the freedom fighters' descendants was restored in July 2024 when the Supreme Court of Bangladesh annulled the earlier cancellation as illegal.²⁸ The court ruling has

²⁴ Md. Kamal Uddin, "Human Rights Abuses and Criminal Justice in Policing Practices in Bangladesh," *Criminology & Criminal Justice* 24, no. 4 (September 25, 2024): 733–56, <https://doi.org/10.1177/17488958221120915>.

²⁵ Zainuddin, Islam, and Arif, "From Quota Reform to Regime Collapse: Understanding the Anti-Discrimination Movement in Bangladesh."

²⁶ Waseq Billah and Syeda Lasna Kabir, "Role of Women in Civil Service: Implications for Effective and Inclusive Governance in Bangladesh," in *Governance and Sustainable Development in South Asia* (Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2024), 107–22, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-67616-1_6.

²⁷ Abu Sufian, "Geopolitics of the NRC-CAA in Assam: Impact on Bangladesh–India Relations," *Asian Ethnicity* 23, no. 3 (July 3, 2022): 556–86, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14631369.2020.1820854>.

²⁸ Fahim Abrar Abid et al., "Annual Human Rights Report 2024: Election, July Revolution, and Minorities in Bangladesh," *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2025, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5161727>.

attracted immediate reaction from university students and job seekers, who view it as a problem for the appreciation of merit and as a politically charged move to secure greater loyalty among elites ahead of future elections.²⁹

This is because the early protests, which began on a small scale, escalated into nationwide collective protests among students. This shift has been driven by growing concerns about youth unemployment, a lack of transparency in governance, and widespread dissatisfaction with the ruling party. Students from various universities, especially in Dhaka and Rajshahi, have formed groups and conducted peaceful sit-ins, marches, and online activism under the motto "No Quota without Merit." The police interventions, arrests, and internet blockage, which were also government actions, backfired, strengthening the resolve of the protestors and shifting public sentiment in their favor.³⁰

An initial wave of protest grew as the movement expanded to encompass other areas of concern, such as electoral reform, police accountability, and the resignation of the current government. Analysts have pointed out that, unlike its predecessor in 2018, which arose amid conditions of zero electoral manipulation and surges in democratic traditions, the 2024 movement appeared against a backdrop of considerable allegations of electoral manipulation and a wavering of democratic practices, and thus became more influential and politically relevant.³¹

Human Cost of the 2024 Student Movement: Fatalities, Injuries, and Mass Arrests

The 2024 Bangladesh student protests were characterized by significant turbulence; consequently, the community was significantly affected. According to a report published by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the involvement of state forces between July 1 and August 15, 2024, led to a total of more than 1,400 deaths, a significant part of which is extrajudicial. It is important to note that of the number of people who were killed, at least 12-13 percent were minors, and this is the reason why a serious review of the actions of security agencies is necessary.³² The tragic death of a life reiterates the large responsibilities that governmental authorities have and the greater issues involved in protecting civilians during the course of political upheaval.

The sheer amount of life lost was also accompanied by over 22,000 people suffering various injuries that ranged in severity, with some people even showing

²⁹ Mahmud, "Crisis Management of the Anti-Quota Student Movement in Bangladesh: Governance Capacity in Misery."

³⁰ Firdous Azim and Tabassum Zaman, "Awaiting a New Dawn in Bangladesh," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 25, no. 6 (November 21, 2024): 951–61, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14649373.2024.2407264>.

³¹ Curtis, "Bangladesh: The Fall of the Hasina Government and Recent Political Developments."

³² OHCHR, "UN Human Rights Investigation May Support Accountability for Bangladeshi Student Crackdown."

catastrophic injuries (eruption).³³ Active use of diverse types of arms, including lethal and less-lethal tools, such as rubber bullets, tear gas, batons, and live ammunition by law enforcement bodies has been captured in field reports and through video analysis conducted by Amnesty International.³⁴ There were reports of numerous people injured due to stampedes that were triggered by sudden police activities, as well as those that occurred during instances of custodial violence after mass arrests. Such an extent and somberness of these injuries testify to the inconsistency and complexity of the response laid to demure demonstrations.

It has also been noted that 9,000 citizens, including university students, professors, journalists, and human rights advocates, were detained during the six-week period of protests.³⁵ One has noted that some of the detainees have not had access to quality legal representation, some have been detained beyond a reasonable time without charge, and others have complained of intimidation and even maltreatment during their custody. The continued occurrence of such detentions indicates that there is a major problem concerning the concept of arbitrary arrest and detention in the country, which has caused great concern to human rights networks about the commitment of Bangladesh to international law.³⁶

The data presented in aggregate terms indicate the considerable character of the state's response to the demonstrations. The resulting loss of life, the serious injuries sustained, and the large number of people detained highlight that there is a serious question of the call for better governance and accountability measures. The emphasis on youthful protesters, as well as limited internet access, which impedes the international community's ability to document the protests and oversee the process, are signs of a systematic attempt to diminish opposition and prevent international attention.³⁷ The contemporary resonance of these problems also significantly contributes to the national discourse on civil liberties, student rights movements, and the state's role in promoting democratic change.

Concerns from International Organizations

In July 2024, whether out of spontaneity among its activists and supporters or as part of a planned strategy, a series of demonstrations became a major political movement in the country's recent history.³⁸ These protests began in Dhaka and soon spread to other major cities, where protesters have been blocking major roads,

³³ Pranjal Khare and Vishambhar Raghuwanshi, "Exploring the Complexities of India-Bangladesh Relations," in *International Relations Theory and Philosophical Political Insights Into Conflict Management* (New York, 2025), 209–30, <https://doi.org/10.4018/979-8-3693-9626-1.ch009>.

³⁴ Sarker, Ahmed, and Islam, "Police Accountability in Criminal Investigation: USA and Bangladesh."

³⁵ Ankita Mukherjee, "Bangladesh Crisis and Challenges for India," 2025, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5284473>.

³⁶ Bukhari, Ali, and Haq, "Realigning Alliances in South Asia: Exploring the Dynamics of Pakistan-Bangladesh Relations in a Post-Hasina Era."

³⁷ Abid et al., "Annual Human Rights Report 2024: Election, July Revolution, and Minorities in Bangladesh."

³⁸ Veena Sikri, "The Geo-Strategics of Regime Change in Bangladesh," *National Security* 7, no. 4 (March 19, 2025): 237–50, <https://doi.org/10.32381/NS.2024.07.04.1>.

holding demonstrations, and demanding systemic changes, primarily eliminating the quota system and moving toward merit-based selection in government.³⁹ The government reacted actively and quickly. In response to the circumstances, the government has imposed a curfew, initiated arrests of student community leaders, and banned mobile phones to prevent internet access, among other measures aimed at curbing public unrest.⁴⁰ Police services, including those that belonged to the ruling party, had a degree of force usage that did not seem proportional enough to the conditions that surrounded unarmed protesters, leading to several injuries and some deaths that were unfortunate.⁴¹ One of the most striking and threatening events during the revolt occurred on the 18th of July, when police units engaged demonstrators in Dhaka, Chittagong, and Rangpur. According to reports from various observers and media outlets, the atmosphere in the affected areas was characterized by widespread concern and confusion, with police officers storming university campuses where students had taken shelter. The recent event in which a student named Abu Sayeed was killed in an altercation in Rangpur has turned out to be a major symbol of the ongoing movement.⁴²

The government has announced an official statement, according to which 625 people were killed and over 18,000 people were injured because of the protests.⁴³ Opposition organizations and independent observers have also suggested that the actual numbers may be higher. It has been noted that the figures of people who were killed and whose deaths have not been recognized officially could be enormous, due to the clashes between law enforcement and political militias. Amnesty International has also reported its apprehension over the use of lethal force by the state, as it might not be in accordance with the well-known international human rights standards.⁴⁴ Children are unfortunate to have been victims of violence. The recent case of the dreadful death of a 12-year-old madrasa boy, Zobaid Hossain Emon, shot dead by a police helicopter, has attracted a lot of attention and apprehension.⁴⁵ It was

³⁹ Mustak Ahmed, "Today, the Entire Bangladesh Is Hostage to the Crowds: Mob Trials, Digital Panic, and the Algorithmic Collapse of Rule of Law After 5 August 2024," June 16, 2025, <https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202506.1231.v1>.

⁴⁰ Arild Engelsen Ruud and Mubashar Hasan, "Democratic Bricolage: Resilience and Innovation in Autocratic Bangladesh," *Asian Survey* 64, no. 3 (June 1, 2024): 452–79, <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2024.2092052>.

⁴¹ Mahmud, "Crisis Management of the Anti-Quota Student Movement in Bangladesh: Governance Capacity in Misery."

⁴² Khairul Chowdhury, Nasim Aziz, and Saleh Al Mamun, "Counterinsurgency, Forest Governance, and the Dynamics of Change in the Forests of South Asia: Transition in Bangladesh's Forests," *Trees, Forests and People* 18 (December 2024): 100691, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tfp.2024.100691>.

⁴³ Md Abu Bakkar Siddik et al., "Use of Lethal Weapons to Kill Protesters by Bangladesh Police: A Discussion Analyzing 253 Deaths of July 24 Revolution," *Dialogues in Health* 8 (June 2026): 100277, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dialog.2026.100277>.

⁴⁴ Siddik et al.

⁴⁵ Abid et al., "Annual Human Rights Report 2024: Election, July Revolution, and Minorities in Bangladesh."

reported that nearly 121 children had died between the events of the July uprising.⁴⁶ Issues regarding the interventions by security forces have been raised which shows that live ammunition has been used in populated areas and this would have unintended consequences such as on students, bystanders, and civilians. Several of the families that have suffered the heavy loss of their beloved ones have voiced their concerns about the incidents of harassment, intimidation, and surveillance, which can be seen to be aimed at scaring them either away from seeking justice or talking to the media.⁴⁷

Throughout this time, we have witnessed a sharp increase in the detainment rates in the country. Scores of activists, students, civilians have been reported on detention, being often deprived of any charges filed against them, according to a recent report conducted by Human Rights Watch. Stories of those who were subjected to detention imply that there are grave conditions in the overcrowded facilities as individuals have reported physical and psychological abuse. The legal representatives and members of the family encountered significant obstacles that required them to receive information or visit the detainees and this contributed to obscurity in the subject matter of what the state was doing.⁴⁸ Verification of the data on the number of casualties and arrests has been very difficult, especially because the government has implemented immense internet blackouts, media censorship among other parameters to limit reporting. Human rights monitors and journalists often encountered a significant number of difficulties in their attempt to report the facts accurately, including being obstructed, threatened, or detained. There was dismay in the international community.⁴⁹ Volker T.-R. T., the United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights remarked:

The grisly response was a pre-planned and well-organized tact by the previous Government to maintain control when faced with popular unrest. There are plausible reasons to believe that hundreds of people were killed extra-judicially, scores were arbitrarily arrested and detained, and some were tortured,⁵⁰ but this was done by the knowledge, coordination, and direction of the political leadership and senior security officials.⁵¹

⁴⁶ Ahmed, "Today, the Entire Bangladesh Is Hostage to the Crowds: Mob Trials, Digital Panic, and the Algorithmic Collapse of Rule of Law After 5 August 2024."

⁴⁷ Rahat Jahangir Rony and Nova Ahmed, "Teens Online Behavior and Support Interventions in Bangladesh," *ACM Journal on Computing and Sustainable Societies* 3, no. 1 (March 31, 2025): 1–22, <https://doi.org/10.1145/3704813>.

⁴⁸ Abu Saleh et al., "The Role of Theatre for Development in Reducing Prevalent Harmful Traditional Practices in the Rural North of Bangladesh," *Community Development Journal*, July 2, 2025, <https://doi.org/10.1093/cdj/bsaf014>.

⁴⁹ Iftakhar Ali Khandokar et al., "Temporal, Demographic, and Geographical Analysis of Violent Events in Bangla News Media Using NLP Techniques," *Human-Centric Intelligent Systems* 5, no. 1 (February 25, 2025): 90–102, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s44230-025-00092-8>.

⁵⁰ OHCHR, "UN Human Rights Investigation May Support Accountability for Bangladeshi Student Protests Repression."

⁵¹ Mahmud, "Crisis Management of the Anti-Quota Student Movement in Bangladesh: Governance Capacity in Misery."

Global Responses to Bangladesh's Political Transition after the July Revolution

Since the revolution of July 2024 and the interim government of Muhammad Yunus, many international and regional organizations have been involved in the current situation through thoughtful action and planning that pertains to their geopolitical interest and the convoluted relationship they had with Dhaka.

1) *Engagement with Strategic Depth -China*

China has responded mildly but with support and this implies that it supports the leadership transition of Bangladesh.⁵² An official of the Chinese Foreign Ministry told reporters in August 2024 that the situation in Bangladesh had stabilized and that China, as a neighboring country, was relieved to see that calm had been restored.⁵³ In Yunus' visit to Beijing in March 2025, in four days, President Xi Jinping assured the interim government of China of continuing support of the reform set by it. Xi pledged greater economic and technical assistance, including reductions in interest rates on concessional and buyer credits. The deals were entered into in principle to construct a 1,000-bed hospital in Dhaka and to grant Bangladesh patients access to the hospitals in Yunnan, which symbolizes China's health diplomacy push.⁵⁴

China has also strongly signaled its interest in building long-term relationships in Dhaka, reflecting its intention to invest at least in supporting infrastructure, healthcare, and trade finance, in a manner that underscores non-interference and deep respect for Bangladesh's sovereignty. By emphasizing its respect for Bangladesh's sovereignty and its determination not to intervene, China has expanded its engagement in infrastructure, healthcare, and the business side of trade finance, which it is willing to extend in Dhaka at this crucial juncture.⁵⁵

2) *A Case of Strategic Discomfort and Diplomatic Reserve by India*

India has been reacting cautiously and without any degree of comfort. The exodus of Sheikh Hasina, a close ally of New Delhi, had suggested a probable dip in powers in Dhaka and also raised concerns of changes in regional alignment.⁵⁶ Border

⁵² Pascal Abb, "Is There a Chinese 'Developmental Peace'? Evidence from the Belt and Road Initiative's Impact on Conflict States," *Journal of Contemporary China* 34, no. 155 (September 3, 2025): 861–79, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2024.2378043>.

⁵³ Silvia Tieri and Raian Hossain, "Bangladesh 2023-2024: From Democratic Backsliding to the Monsoon Revolution, Towards Democratic Transition," *Asia Maior* 35 (2024): 31, <https://www.asiamaior.org/?p=2317>.

⁵⁴ Md. Ikhtiar Uddin Bhuiyan and Mohammad Tarikul Islam, "China's Economic Diplomacy with Bangladesh: Opportunities and Challenges," in *Bangladesh–China Connectivity* (Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2024), 93–111, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-4848-8_6.

⁵⁵ Mohammad Razaul Karim, "China's Strategic Partnership with Bangladesh: India's Reaction and Global Migration Effects," in *Governance, Migration and Security in International Relations* (Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2024), 103–15, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-9424-3_7.

⁵⁶ AKM Ahsan Ullah, "India-Bangladesh Borders After the July–August 2024 Uprising: A Future Unfolds Beyond Our Conventional Knowledge," *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, July 15, 2025, <https://doi.org/10.1177/20578911251355725>.

security, the emergence problem of cross-border extremism, and the transforming relations between Dhaka, Beijing, and Islamabad are some of the issues raised by India as a point of concern.⁵⁷

Though the Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi has opted not to directly criticize the new government, it is evident that there has been a shift of the cordiality of relation. Many observers indicate that India can prefer to watch the waters till further action is possible, because the political and electoral ground is not laid open clear enough in Bangladesh.⁵⁸

3) *United States: Concerned Opportunism and Tactical Rebalancing*

The United States is considered to have an optimistic view and considered reasoning orientation in regards to the re-engagement. The United States initially gave travel advisories based on the unrest but later on took a more encouraging stand in the following months. Lawmakers in the US, such as Senator Ben Cardin, have demanded that a credible, inclusive electoral roadmap should be put in place under a purported impartial supervision.⁵⁹ By September 2024, over \$200 million have been assisted by USAID, which is a noteworthy revitalization of relations with Bangladesh.⁶⁰ Washington views the Yunus-led government as a manifestation of progressive thinking and as an opportunity to position Bangladesh as a stabilizing force amid the increasing influence of China and Russia in the Bay of Bengal.

4) *Pakistan: Diplomatic Normalization Strategic Synergy*

The revolution gave Pakistan an opportunity to re-engage more than a decade after relations had been paralyzed. By the beginning of 2025, high-level consultations between Islamabad and Dhaka had resumed, marking the first such interaction in 15 years. Pakistan views the leadership transition in Dhaka as a significant opportunity to enhance collaboration across trade, education, healthcare, and maritime connectivity, particularly within regional platforms led by China. The recent rise in relations has heightened strategic concerns in India, which now faces a multidimensional challenge from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and China.⁶¹

5) *Russia: Silent Continuity through Strategic Project*

Russia has opted for a quiet, albeit steady, approach, avoiding overt political utterances. However, it is largely determined by a set of strategic initiatives,

⁵⁷ Amena Mohsin et al., eds., *The Futures of Borders and Geopolitics in South Asia*, Global Political Transitions (Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2024), <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-6595-9>.

⁵⁸ Md Abul Hasan, "The Dilemmas of Bangladesh as a Weak State in South Asia," *Public Administration and Policy* 27, no. 3 (December 4, 2024): 316–29, <https://doi.org/10.1108/PAP-01-2024-0010>.

⁵⁹ Mahmud, "Crisis Management of the Anti-Quota Student Movement in Bangladesh: Governance Capacity in Misery."

⁶⁰ Abul Kalam and Md. Al-Mamun, "Analyzing the Rhetoric of Contemporary BSMRSTU Student Movements: Manifestations and Social Implications in Gopalganj, Bangladesh," *Frontiers in Political Science* 6 (June 6, 2024), <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2024.1307615>.

⁶¹ Garima Das, "India-Pakistan Rivalry in May 2025, Conflict, Proxy Warfare, and Geo-Political Alignments," *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2025, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5715602>.

particularly the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant, which is on schedule.⁶² The relations between Moscow and Bangladesh have been based mainly on cooperation in the spheres of energy and military. Analysts note that the Kremlin is shifting its strategy in South Asia to remain relevant in an increasingly tense US-China rivalry and is willing to cooperate with the de facto government, so long as its investments are sufficiently safeguarded.⁶³

Bangladesh Government Announces Incentives after 2024 Student Protests

Evaluations of the formation of an interim government after the student uprising in Bangladesh in July 2024 require a careful study of the constitutional set up, specifically the 15th Amendment to the Constitution that was enacted in 2011 by the Awami League government. This amendment got rid of the stipulation of the non-partisan caretaker government that came into effect under the Thirteenth Amendment in 1996 as a means of answering the widespread demands of impartiality in electoral politics.⁶⁴ The Fifteenth Amendment deemed this mechanism unconstitutional because the rule of unelected officials contradicts democratic principles. However, not all observers agreed as critics have it that its deletion contributed to the growing distrust of the electoral process, especially among the youth, civil society, and the opposition parties.⁶⁵

A neutral government in the election was one major issue that emerged during student protests in 2024. Although the initial pressure was to reestablish the civil service quota in favor of descendants of freedom fighters, the movement quickly expanded to encompass broader democratic reforms, particularly the formation of a nonpartisan transitional government.⁶⁶ A large group of citizens believes that the loss of electoral integrity and the accumulation of power over the past ten years are symptoms of the Fifteenth Amendment, which has seemingly eliminated a legal means of ensuring inclusive and fair elections.⁶⁷ In August 2024, a transitional government under Muhammad Yunus was appointed in light of recent challenges and a nationwide push toward stability at home and abroad. Although this framework was not institutionally enforced through the constitutional system that evolved after 2011, it gained credibility through public support and that of the armed

⁶² Valerii Muzykant and Barek Hossain, “Shifting Narratives: Russia’s Image in South Asian Media in 2022–2024: By the Example of the Mass Media in People’s Republic of Bangladesh,” *Theoretical and Practical Issues of Journalism* 13, no. 4 (December 9, 2024): 710–22, [https://doi.org/10.17150/2308-6203.2024.13\(4\).710-722](https://doi.org/10.17150/2308-6203.2024.13(4).710-722).

⁶³ Azim and Zaman, “Awaiting a New Dawn in Bangladesh.”

⁶⁴ Joya Joyshree Das and Mannan Kazi Abdul, “The Legitimacy of the Interim Government Formed in Bangladesh on August 8, 2024: A Mixed Approach,” *Journal of State Government and Mass Media* 3, no. 3 (September 20, 2025): 1, <https://doi.org/10.64907/xkmf.v3i3.jsghmm1>.

⁶⁵ M. Jashim Ali Chowdhury, *Fifty Years of Bangladesh Parliament: A Critical Evaluation* (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill | Nijhoff, 2025), <https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004720831>.

⁶⁶ Rounaq Jahan, “Bangladesh: The Challenge of Breaking Away From Past Undemocratic Practices,” *The Round Table* 114, no. 1 (January 2, 2025): 59–62, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2025.2457264>.

⁶⁷ Srimanti Sarkar, “Electoral Dynamics in Bangladesh: From Independence to Democratic Chaos (1971–2024),” in *Electoral Politics in Asia* (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2025), 159–84, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-96-8082-5_7.

forces.⁶⁸ It was seen as consistent with the principle of necessity, which could be invoked to argue that governance that exceeds constitutional limits in national emergencies may be acceptable.⁶⁹ The interim government has been given the massive mandate of seeking stability in the country and restoring democratic principles; this has been the foundation on which it has been functioning, under the pretext of free and fair elections.⁷⁰ The promise embraces the following: 1) Reforms to improve the election process; 2) The commencement of independent investigations into the violence related to protests; 3) The re-emergence of the freedom of the press and civil liberties.

The responses of the global society were not only deep but also positive overall. The United Nations and European Union emphasized the importance of legal responsibility and universally inclusive electoral planning, and countries such as the United States and Canada provided technical assistance to restore the democratic order.⁷¹ In the meantime, China and India recognized the new government, with stability and bilateralism taking center stage, with no emphasis on domestic political outcomes.⁷² The debate concerning the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, which emanate from the constant BA, needs to balance democratic responsibility with institutional stability, and this debate has re-emerged in the socio-sphere.⁷³ Although the Fifteenth Amendment was enacted to elevate the status of parliament, the events of 2024 demonstrate that the abolition of the caretaker government provision has contributed to political instability.⁷⁴ The interim government, although not constitutionally endorsed, is generally regarded as a crucial measure in light of the extraordinary national circumstances currently facing the country.⁷⁵

⁶⁸ Anshuman Behera, “Interrogating Political Crisis in Bangladesh: Limited Democracy, Islamization of Polity, and External Power Politics,” *Journal of World Affairs: Voice of the Global South* 1, no. 2 (August 22, 2025): 210–27, <https://doi.org/10.1177/23477970251357705>.

⁶⁹ Mohammad Saiful Islam, Abdul Malek, and Anjuman Ara Begum, “A Legal Analysis of the Constitutional Court and Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments in Bangladesh,” *Beijing Law Review* 15, no. 04 (2024): 2018–33, <https://doi.org/10.4236/blr.2024.154113>.

⁷⁰ Joyshree Das and Kazi Abdul, “The Legitimacy of the Interim Government Formed in Bangladesh on August 8, 2024: A Mixed Approach.”

⁷¹ Samiul Hasan, “Bangladesh Constitutional Reform 2025: Almost There!,” *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2025, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5966194>.

⁷² Puxin Zhang et al., “Same Goal, Different Paths: Contrasting Approaches to AI Regulation in China and India,” *Telecommunications Policy* 49, no. 8 (September 2025): 103019, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2025.103019>.

⁷³ Md. Alomgir Hossan, “Students’ Perspective on the Interim Government of Bangladesh: A Study at the University of Rajshahi,” *HISTORICAL: Journal of History and Social Sciences* 4, no. 3 (September 19, 2025): 389–413, <https://doi.org/10.58355/historical.v4i3.205>.

⁷⁴ Md. Yeasir Arafat and Fahmida, “History, Agendas, and Anomalies of Bangladesh Politics,” *DIROSAT: Journal of Education, Social Sciences & Humanities* 3, no. 2 (July 21, 2025): 323–41, <https://doi.org/10.58355/dirosat.v3i2.158>.

⁷⁵ Mohammad Mizanur Rahman, Ahmed Shafiqul Huque, and Mokbul Morshed Ahmad, “Civil Service and Socio-Economic Progress in Bangladesh: A Developmental State Perspective,” *Public Administration and Policy*, June 27, 2025, <https://doi.org/10.1108/PAP-12-2024-0189>.

Responses of the International Community Using Human Rights and Constitutional Standards

The foreign reaction to the student movement of July 2024 in Bangladesh should not be interpreted solely as a diplomatic response but as a normative response grounded in constitutional and international legal practice.⁷⁶ On the domestic level, the Constitution of the People Republic of Bangladesh (1972) provides diverse fundamental rights, such as the right to life and personal liberty (Article 32), the right not to be arrested and detained without any reason (Article 33), the right to assemble (Article 37), and the right to express oneself (Article 39). The rights are the essence of the Bangladesh constitutional order and the legal basis of the Bangladesh democratic order.⁷⁷

The mass deployment of lethal force against the 2024 student movement, mass arrests without due process, custodial ill-treatment as well as extended internet blackouts were considered a systematic interruption of these constitutional guarantees. It is particularly noteworthy that such actions were enforced without any formally declared state of emergency, through constitutional procedures. This put the state into a de facto constitutional emergency, with normal constitutional safeguards effectively nullified by law and without any legal sanction. According to constitutional law, such practices undermine constitutional supremacy and erode the rule of law, as they enable executive action to operate outside constitutional restraints.

The international actors and their reactions were clearly defined, with references to these constitutional violations: the United Nations, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and some Western democratic states. They consistently emphasized accountability, due process, proportionality in the use of force, and the restoration of civil liberties.⁷⁸ These reactions can be seen as expressing internationally accepted constitutional standards, especially the teaching that some rights, including the right to life and the right of non-torture are non-derogable even in states of emergency. The constitutional sanctity of these rights is supported by the directorate of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention against Torture (CAT), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and restricts the extent of what the state is allowed to do in emergencies.

The long-term internet blockage, which was also enforced in the course of the protests, also became a big constitutional issue. The right to information and freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article 39 of the Constitution and Article

⁷⁶ Hasan, “Bangladesh Constitutional Reform 2025: Almost There!”

⁷⁷ Manwendra Kumar Tiwari, “The Purposive Entrenchment of Constitutional Identity: Insights from Bangladesh,” *Constitutional Review* 11, no. 1 (2025): 166–96, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.31078/consrev1116>.

⁷⁸ Joydip Chowdhury, “The Dilemma Between Fundamental Rights and Human Rights in the Constitution of Bangladesh: A Comparative Analysis,” 2025, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5262968>.

19 of the ICCPR, was severely restricted. The reaction of the international community over and over again was that blanket internet shutdowns in times of political unrest are disproportionate and cannot be combined with constitutional democracy since they impede transparency, limit civic engagement and the ability to independently document rights abuses. Conventionally, the constitutionally correct thing to do is to take such actions, which undermine democratic accountability and allow unchecked executive authority.⁷⁹

Opposing international reaction also demonstrates the opposite meaning of the constitutional responsibility. Whereas the West democracies and rights-based institutions had been focusing on constitutionalism, legality, and accountability, the regions like China and India had focused on stability, sovereignty, and non-intervention.⁸⁰ This deviation demonstrates the extent to which geopolitical interests may weaken constitutional norms in international practice, even when there are obvious constitutional failures.⁸¹ Nevertheless, the prolonged focus on the constitutional norms of international human rights institutions was instrumental in delegitimizing the incumbent government's actions.

Finally, foreign interaction helped in defining the political shift that was to happen after the Awami league government collapsed.⁸² The emergence of the interim administration under circumstances of constitutional necessity reflects a broader constitutional dilemma:⁸³ the necessity of preserving the continuity of the law and of reinstating the constitutional order.⁸⁴ To this end, international reactions served not merely as a mode of concern but as mechanisms of constitutional accountability that, in that regard, further strengthen the principle that constitutional government and basic rights cannot be suspended at all times under the pretext of political stability.

Conclusion

The student movement that occurred on July 2024 in Bangladesh is a historical constitutional moment that showed the weakness of constitutional rule when there is political pressure and the presence of executive rule. Resistance to the

⁷⁹ Zahid Hasan Reyad et al., "Public Opinion Transforms Legislative Decisions in Bangladesh: A Case Study Focusing on the Constitutional Law," *Cambridge Open Engage*, April 15, 2025, <https://doi.org/10.33774/coe-2025-rdkkp>.

⁸⁰ Kai He and Feng Liu, *China's Bilateral Relations and Order Transition in the Indo-Pacific* (Singapore: World Scientific, 2025), <https://doi.org/10.1142/q0480>.

⁸¹ Surendra Kumar Yadawa, "Popular Uprising Brings Regime Changes, but Democratic Institutions Determine Survival of Democracy (in Bangladesh)," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, August 23, 2025, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096251365458>.

⁸² Faizar Md Saolin, "Awami League's Competitive Authoritarian Rule in Bangladesh (2014-2024)," 2025, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5261820>.

⁸³ Md. Abdul Jalil, Md. Zahidul Islam, and Muhammad Khalilur Rahman, "Towards A Legal Mandate: The Struggle for the Recognition of the July 2024 Revolution in Bangladesh," *Ind J Human Soc Sci* 6, no. 11 (2025): 8–16, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17592962>.

⁸⁴ Zahid Hasan Reyad et al., "Trias Politica in the Proposed Constitutional Framework: A Study of Bangladesh," *Cambridge Open Engage*, April 14, 2025, <https://doi.org/10.33774/coe-2025-00jm0>.

reinstatement of the civil service quota system escalated into a broader constitutional crisis, marked by widespread suspension of fundamental rights, including the rights to life, personal liberty, freedom of assembly, and freedom of expression. The use of excessive force and mass arrests as well as long-term internet blackouts by the state, which was not proclaimed by the constitutional emergency, established a de facto emergency regime, weakening the constitutional supremacy and the rule of law.

The reaction of international community to the crisis was very important in the way it framed such developments as the violations of the human rights but also the constitutional commitment. Accountability, proportionality, and non-derogable rights were repeatedly promoted by the United Nations, international human rights agencies and also by some democratic states, which underlined the idea that constitutional guarantees should not be arbitrarily suspended even in the case of unrest. On the contrary, the more conservative reactions of some regional powers demonstrated the conflict between constitutionalism and geopolitics in international practice. This divergence indicates that constitutional norms are unevenly applied globally and that domestic constitutional orders are weak in strategically sensitive situations.

The political change, which ensued, the overthrow of the sitting government and the establishment of an interim administration, presents some vexing constitutional questions, which are based on questions of legality, legitimacy, and necessity. Although the interim government was not formally established by the constitution, it can be interpreted within the framework of the doctrine of constitutional necessity, whereby a temporary mechanism was created to restore constitutional order, protect basic rights, and create the preconditions for democratic renewal. There are, however, real dangers of dependence on necessity as a constitutional defense, especially when there is a lack of definite time constraints, institutional responsibility, and a plausible way back to the constitutional byway.

Compared with the Bangladesh case, the case illustrates how international human rights mechanisms and International diplomacy can serve as an external check on a non-constitutional government when domestic institutions have failed to provide viable solutions. The 2024 events confirm the primacy of the constitutional guarantees, the independence of the judiciary, and the use of open emergency protocols to avert the routine of extraordinary actions. Finally, the paper points out that constitutional systems must strike a balance between stability and accountability to ensure that emergency governance does not become an alternative to, but an exception within, constitutional democracy.

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