

Cabinet Structure during the State Financial Crisis: A Comparison of Budget Efficiency Policies between Indonesia and Argentina

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the financial crises in Indonesia and Argentina, focusing on the cabinet structure policies of these two countries. It aims to examine the policy models of the Indonesian and Argentine governments for restructuring their cabinets in response to the crisis while also implementing budgetary efficiency measures. This study contributes to the development of an adaptive and efficient model for cabinet restructuring in response to financial crises, and can serve as a reference for the formulation of fiscal and institutional policies. The study employs a doctrinal legal research method with a statute and comparative approach. The findings indicate that Indonesia's operational expenditures are high; however, political considerations have resulted in inefficiencies, such as the expansion of ministries from 34 to 48. Indonesia's fiscal efficiency remains inconsistent due to political limitations. In contrast, Argentina has enacted comprehensive and more decisive reforms, reducing the number of ministries from 18 to 8 and implementing extensive cuts across the government. Therefore, the results suggest that Indonesia's policies are constrained by political and legal constraints, whereas Argentina's approach relies on strong executive decrees. This study recommends that Indonesia consider merging related ministries and streamlining bureaucratic structures in accordance with national circumstances. Additionally, it proposes strengthening executive governance through legal reforms, such as establishing a formal presidential office and restricting the scope of non-essential institutions, to improve budget efficiency.

Introduction

In early 2024, Prabowo Subianto was inaugurated as President of Indonesia for the 2024-2029 term,¹ with Gibran Rakabuming Raka as his vice president.² During Prabowo Gibran's administration, the term "Zaken Cabinet" was introduced,

¹ Honna Jun, "2024 Indonesian Presidential Election: How Prabowo Won," *Asia-Pacific Review* 31, no. 2 (May 3, 2024): 105–16, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13439006.2024.2398375>.

² Yohanes Sulaiman, "The Implications of Prabowo Subianto's Presidential Win for Indonesia's Security Policy," *Asia Policy* 19, no. 4 (October 2024): 130–40, <https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2024.a942839>.

referring to a cabinet of experts comprising professionals in their respective fields. During President Joko Widodo's administration, there were only 34 ministries.³ However, under President Prabowo, the number of ministers and deputy ministers increased to 48 and 56, respectively, comprising seven coordinating ministers and 41 technical ministers.⁴ Moreover, the absence of more specific regulations on the number of ministries a president may form could affect the government's effectiveness and efficiency.⁵

The issuance of Presidential Instruction (Intruksi Presiden: Inpres) No. 1 of 2025 on state budget efficiency has sparked much public debate. The state budget efficiency, totaling Rp. 306.69 trillion is intended to benefit the Indonesian people and reduce wasteful budget expenditures.⁶ Concerns have been raised about a potential decline in the quality of basic public services crucial to citizens' development, as Aidul Fitriada Azhari noted that the current government's budget efficiency policy contains a structural dilemma. On the one hand, the policy aims to minimize waste; on the other hand, the cabinet has expanded (now exceeding 100 ministers and ministerial-level officials). Although the Ministry Law allows for 48 ministers, it still contradicts the principle of efficiency.⁷

Argentina shares several similarities with Indonesia in terms of its political system. First, Argentina and Indonesia are both presidential republics, with the president serving as both the head of state and the head of government. This is evidenced by Indonesia's status as a democratic, unitary republic, as enshrined in the 1945 Constitution.⁸ Argentina is evidenced by the Constitución de la Nación Argentina, or the Argentine national constitution, Article 1 of which states that the Argentine people adopt a representative republic.⁹ The next similarity is the economic challenges that require the heads of both

³ Muhamad Haripin, Adhi Priamarizki, and Sigit S. Nugroho, "Quasi-Civilian Defence Minister and Civilian Authority: The Case Study of Indonesia's Ministry of Defence During Joko Widodo's Presidency," *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics* 8, no. 1 (March 7, 2023): 164–83, <https://doi.org/10.1177/20578911221141016>.

⁴ Manggi Habir and Siwage Dharma Negara, "Prabowo's First 100 Days and beyond as President: A Security-Focused Economic Agenda," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 61, no. 1 (January 2, 2025): 3–37, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2025.2483310>.

⁵ Andri Yanto et al., "Towards Improved Regulatory Efficiency: Reconstruction of Ministerial Regulations to Enhance Regulatory Reform in Indonesia," *Novum Jus* 19, no. 1 (March 25, 2025): 239–63, <https://doi.org/10.14718/NovumJus.2025.19.1.9>.

⁶ Dewa Astika, Chrisyanto Tri, and Muhammad Syahrul Alim, "Budget Efficiency In The 2025 Regional Budget (APBD) Planning Of West Java Province: A Policy Response To Presidential Instruction No. 1 Of 2025," *Irpia: Jurnal Ilmiah Riset Dan Pengembangan*, June 30, 2024, 45–60, <https://doi.org/10.71040/irpia.v10i2.286>.

⁷ Berita UMS, "Efisiensi Anggaran: Hemat Atau Malah Merugikan Masyarakat?," Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta, 2025, <https://news.ums.ac.id/id/02/2025/efisiensi-anggaran-hemat-atau-malah-merugikan-masyarakat/>.

⁸ I Wayan Sudirta et al., "Explore the Values of Pancasila as the Basic Philosophy of the Indonesian Nation," *Arena Hukum* 18, no. 1 (April 30, 2025): 127–58, <https://doi.org/10.21776/ub.arenahukum2025.01801.6>.

⁹ Valentín Figueroa, "The Opposite of Containment: Electoral System Change in Argentina's 1912 Democratic Transition," *Latin American Politics and Society* 67, no. 3 (August 9, 2025): 26–44, <https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2025.3>.

countries to implement budget-efficiency policies.

Argentine President Javier Milei is an economist and politician who has gained prominence in Argentine politics for advocating a free-market economy. Milei became famous when he ran for president and spoke about Argentina's long-standing problems of high inflation, high debt, and economic stagnation.¹⁰ As part of these efforts, President Milei will radically change Argentina's economic system by downsizing the government, dissolving the central bank, and shifting responsibility to individuals rather than solely to government welfare programs.¹¹

The Argentine government issued Emergency Decree No. 70/2023 to support Argentina's economic reconstruction.¹² The contents of the decree show that the Argentine government is drastically changing regulations in the economic and legal sectors. According to a report by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom (*freiheit*), one of the core policies is to streamline the government structure by reducing or merging several ministries and state institutions. The number of ministries has been reduced from 18 to just 8, resulting in fewer employees, the elimination of pension funds and energy subsidies, and the removal of several regulations deemed obsolete. The Argentine government's policy efforts have yielded significant results, showing inflation fell from 117% to 3% in the last three months of 2024.¹³ However, this policy has been controversial because the removal of transportation, energy, and food subsidies has driven up the cost of necessities, resulting in more than 5 million people falling into poverty in the first half of 2024.¹⁴

This study aims to fill a gap in the research, which has not been widely discussed by previous researchers, as most have focused only on the impact of state financial efficiency policies on economic conditions. Tri Akbar Handoko et al. discussed the impact of budget efficiency on Indonesia's tourism sector. They revealed that these budget-efficiency policies have impeded the tourism sector's development. The issue is further complicated by the lack of coordination among state institutions in tourism development, resulting from these budget efficiency policies, which have rendered the tourism sector no longer a government priority programme.¹⁵ Ulfa Jamilatul

¹⁰ A J Bauer, Srirupa Roy, and Verónica Gago, "Toward Comparative Analysis of Right-Authoritarian Politics: Argentina, India, and the US," *Communication, Culture & Critique* 18, no. 1 (March 1, 2025): 9–14, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ccc/tcae051>.

¹¹ Tomás Nougues, *Social Debtfare Policies: The Financialization of Argentina's Welfare Policy*, Latin American Political Economy (Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2025), <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-02568-5>.

¹² Andres Gallo, "The Quest for Institutional Stability: Fiscal Distributive Policies and Economic Crises in Argentina, 2002-2023," *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4574011>.

¹³ Guadalupe Moreno, "Remembering Crises: The Making of Monetary Distrust in Argentina," *Socio-Economic Review*, July 21, 2025, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwaf044>.

¹⁴ Tod S. Van Gunten, "Elite Politics and Economic Crisis: Hyperinflation in Argentina, 1989–1990," in *Elites, Nonelites, and Power* (Leeds: Emerald Publishing Limited, 2024), 141–73, <https://doi.org/10.1108/S0198-871920240000041006>.

¹⁵ Tri Akbar Handoko et al., "Indonesian Government Budget Efficiency, Concerns and Its Impact on the Tourism Sector: A Qualitative Study," *Journal of Rural Tourism* 3, no. 1 (February 10, 2025), <https://doi.org/10.70310/jrt.2025.03010650>.

Farida found that budget efficiency policies affect economic growth. However, Ulfa justified these policies, provided they are implemented properly and in a targeted manner, as they align with the objectives of Islamic economic law.¹⁶ Meanwhile, in the field of cabinet structure, previous research has only discussed the ideal design of the cabinet structure in Indonesia, as studied by Putra Perdana Ahmad Saifulloh et al., who criticised the addition of ministries to President Prabowo's cabinet.¹⁷ However, this research did not analyse the issue from the perspective of budget efficiency and state financial law.

Meanwhile, previous research on budget efficiency policies in Argentina has largely focused on the country's success in addressing financial crises, as studied by Nadeem Ul Haque and Nasir Iqbal, who discussed how reforms to several laws in response to the financial crisis rebuilt the economy.¹⁸ Marius Kleinheyder and Gunther Schnabl also researched President Milei's reform package from an economic perspective, showing that through spending cuts and market deregulation, Argentina had successfully consolidated its public budget. The authors report a sharp decline in inflation, a recovery in growth (with a time lag), and a decline in poverty rates following these reforms. For example, the Milei administration cut the number of ministries by half and dismissed tens of thousands of civil servants.¹⁹

This study conducts an in-depth comparison of cabinet restructuring reforms in Indonesia and Argentina, focusing on their implications for budget efficiency. Indonesia has expanded its cabinet to 48 ministers, from 34 previously, while Javier Milei's government in Argentina has reduced the number of ministries to 9, about half of the previous total. Comparative analysis between cabinet expansion and significant budget reduction has been under-explored, so this study offers a novelty in the form of a budget efficiency policy model in determining the structure and number of cabinets in the Indonesian government, where the cabinet structure is based on a comparative study with Argentina, which is also experiencing a financial crisis. Furthermore, this study emphasises the influence of each country's unique political and institutional context on the results of budget efficiency policies. For example, a comparison between political and legal constraints in Indonesia and executive-decree authority in Argentina illustrates how institutional factors shape the effectiveness of fiscal reforms. This study aims to analyse the implementation and impact of Presidential Instruction of the Republic of Indonesia No. 1 of 2025 and

¹⁶ Ulfa Jamilatul Farida, "Budget Efficiency Policy In the Perspective of Sharia Economic Law," *Southeast Asia Journal of Graduate of Islamic Business and Economics* 4, no. 1 (April 24, 2025): 17–24, <https://doi.org/10.37567/sajibe.v4i1.3747>.

¹⁷ Putra Perdana Ahmad Saifulloh et al., "Reconstruction of Restrictions on the President's Power in Determining the Posture of Ministries in the Indonesian Government System," *Jambura Law Review* 7, no. 2 (2025): 521–58, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.33756/jlr.v7i2.29684>.

¹⁸ Nadeem Ul Haque and Nasir Iqbal, "From Crisis to Reforms in Argentina: Learning for Pakistan" (Islamabad, 2024), <https://pide.org.pk/research/from-crisis-to-reforms-in-argentina-learning-for-pakistan/>.

¹⁹ Marius Kleinheyder and Gunther Schnabl, "Argentina: Javier Milei's Reform Agenda from a Theoretical and Empirical Perspective," *ORDO*, September 16, 2025, <https://doi.org/10.1515/ordo-2025-2025>.

DNU Argentina No. 70/2023 on government budget efficiency.

Methods

A doctrinal legal research method with a descriptive-analytical approach was employed.²⁰ The objective was to systematically describe and analyze the conditions of positive law and to develop recommendations for legal solutions. Primary data comprised legislation and related legal documents. Qualitative analysis of normative texts was conducted, and the findings were presented descriptively, including interpretations of relevant legal principles. Two main approaches were applied to achieve these objectives: a legislative approach, which involved identifying, analyzing, and interpreting laws and regulations, and a comparative approach, which compared practices and provisions in Indonesia and Argentina.

The study is theoretical and comparative, analyzing normative texts qualitatively to explain the structure and function of cabinets and institutions, and then comparing them with legal regulations in other countries. The results of the analysis are presented descriptively, with descriptions and explanations. To achieve the research objectives, two main approaches were used. First, the statutory approach focuses on identifying, studying, and interpreting legislation and regulations relevant to the research topic.²¹ Second, the comparative approach involves comparing provisions and practices in Indonesia with those in Argentina to develop a comparative understanding and explore alternative solutions or regulatory models. The analysis was conducted by examining the regulations' text, interpreting applicable legal principles, and drawing conclusions from these comparative findings.²² The results of the comparative conclusions and the formulations of policy recommendations and legal solutions for potential regulatory improvement.

Discussion

The Urgency and Models of Budget Efficiency Policies in Indonesia and Argentina

During President Prabowo Subianto's tenure, it was evident that budget allocations were focused on several strategic programs. This focus is divided into two main categories. First, the Quick Win Priority Programs (Program Hasil Terbaik Cepat or PHTC) include school renovations; the construction of integrated, high-quality schools; improvements in nutrition through the Free Nutritious Meals (Makan Bergizi Gratis or MBG) program; health infrastructure development; reductions in stunting and tuberculosis rates; poverty alleviation; and strengthening

²⁰ Sanne Taekema, "Theoretical and Normative Frameworks for Legal Research: Putting Theory into Practice," *Law and Method*, no. 2 (February 2018), <https://doi.org/10.5553/REM/.000031>.

²¹ Marco Siino et al., "Exploring LLMs Applications in Law: A Literature Review on Current Legal NLP Approaches," *IEEE Access* 13 (2025): 18253–76, <https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2025.3533217>.

²² Stefan Theil, "Carefully Tailored: Doctrinal Methods and Empirical Contributions," *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies* 45, no. 4 (December 10, 2025): 1047–75, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqaf029>.

of community-based social protection.²³ Second, non-quick-win projects include increasing economic growth, developing high-quality human resources, progressing industrial downstreaming, strengthening the green economy, reforming bureaucracy and regulations, enhancing defence and security capacity, achieving independence in the food and energy sectors, and promoting the values of nationalism, democracy, and human rights.²⁴

Indonesia's State Budget (APBN) in 2024 is expected to experience a deficit.²⁵ 507.8 trillion, equivalent to 2.29% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Although this figure remains within the planned limit, the deficit has increased compared with the previous year, which was 1.65% of GDP.²⁶ This increase in the deficit was mainly due to the rate of growth in state expenditure, which reached 7.3%, while state revenue grew by only 2.1%. In addition, external pressures such as food supply disruptions caused by the “El Niño” phenomenon, high global oil prices, and the slowdown in global economic growth have strained the national fiscal condition.²⁷

State budget management faces increasingly complex challenges as government debt accumulates.²⁸ By the end of November 2024, Indonesia's total government debt stood at IDR. 8,680.12 trillion, with a ratio to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) reaching 39.20%.²⁹ Although this ratio remains below the safe threshold of 60% of GDP, as stipulated in Law Number 17 of 2003 concerning State Finances, the continuous growth in debt indicates the need for the immediate and measured implementation of budget efficiency policies.³⁰

The budget efficiency policy model in Indonesia is implemented through one of the latest legal instruments that forms the basis for the implementation of budget

²³ Sheila Adi Nurmala and Candrika Pratisara Hadi, “Meneropong Efektivitas Dan Efisiensi Kabinet Koalisi Merah Putih Terhadap Tata Kelola Pemerintahan,” *Legal Standing: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum* 9, no. 4 (June 23, 2025): 912–21, <https://doi.org/10.24269/lis.v9i4.11720>.

²⁴ Chadziqatun Najilatil Mazda, Ema Nurhayati, and Rivaldi Ananda Dwi Putra, “Study Behaviour of Prabowo Subianto’s Leadership as the President of Indonesia,” *Southeast Asia Development Research* 1, no. 2 (August 30, 2025): 25–36, <https://doi.org/10.63385/sadr.v1i2.315>.

²⁵ Krisna Gupta, Riandy Laksono, and Rizki N. Siregar, “Prabowonomics: Can Indonesia Really Grow at 8%?,” *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, February 26, 2026, 1–42, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2026.2638632>.

²⁶ Tyo Prassoga and Daryono Soebagiyo, “Analysis of Factors Affecting Budget Deficit in Indonesia,” *Jambura Equilibrium Journal* 7, no. 1 (January 7, 2025): 26–32, <https://doi.org/10.37479/jej.v7i1.27746>.

²⁷ Indah Dwi Agustin, “The Influence of Budget Deficit, Government Spending, and Foreign Debt on Indonesia’s Economic Growth,” *Journal of Current Studies in SDGs* 1, no. 2 (July 8, 2025): 30, <https://doi.org/10.63230/jocsis.1.2.30>.

²⁸ Robert Libra and Muhammad Fauzan, “A Philosophical Review of Justice in Legal Aid after Indonesia’s Budget Efficiency Policy,” *As-Siyasi: Journal of Constitutional Law* 5, no. 2 (December 10, 2025): 299–315, <https://doi.org/10.24042/as-siyasi.v5i2.29209>.

²⁹ Vid Adrison, “Fiscal Sustainability in Indonesia: Policies and Progress,” *Asian Economic Policy Review* 19, no. 2 (July 26, 2024): 224–47, <https://doi.org/10.1111/aepr.12468>.

³⁰ Cosimo Thawley, Masyita Crystallin, and Kiki Verico, “Towards a Higher Growth Path for Indonesia,” *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 60, no. 3 (September 17, 2024): 247–82, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2024.2432035>.

efficiency policies,³¹ namely Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 2025 concerning the efficiency of state spending in the implementation of the 2025 State Budget and Regional Budget, which was issued on January 22, 2025.³² The essence of the Presidential Instruction is as follows: Cut operational spending through IDR savings. 306.69 trillion, including IDR. 256.1 trillion from ministries/agencies and IDR. 50.59 trillion from transfers to regions.³³ The following is a complete list of ministries/agencies that the House of Representatives has approved for budget efficiency in the spending efficiency reconstruction meeting held by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of State Secretariat with ministry/agency leaders on February 11, 2025.³⁴

Table 1. List of Budget Efficiency for the Ministry Per-Commission

Commission in DPR	Efficiency (IDR/Trillion)	Percentage (%)
Commission I	51,02	±24,4%
Commission II	7,77	±3,7%
Commission III	29,90	±14,3%
Commission IV	14,17	±6,8%
Commission V	105,92	±50,6%
Commission VI	0,93	±0,4%
Commission VII	0,08	±0,04%
Total	209,79	100%

Source: *Tirto.id*, *Rincian Efisiensi Anggaran Semua K/L Yang Terdampak Tahun 2025*, <https://tirto.id/rincian-efisiensi-anggaran-semua-k-l-yang-terdampak-tahun-2025-g77l>

Then, based on the Minister of Finance Decree Number 29 of 2025 concerning Adjustments to the Details of Regional Transfer Allocations by Province,³⁵ Regency/City for the 2025 Fiscal Year in the Context of Expenditure Efficiency in the Implementation of the State Revenue and Expenditure Budget and Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget for the 2025 Fiscal Year.³⁶ The efficiency portion

³¹ Lalu Aria Nata Kusuma and Nawaz Syarif, “The Implications of Changes in the State Budget (APBN) through Presidential Instruction (Inpres) from the Perspective of Administrative Law,” *Lex Journal: Kajian Hukum Dan Keadilan* 9, no. 2 (April 18, 2025): 199–218, <https://doi.org/10.25139/lex.v9i2.10047>.

³² Munawir Munawir, Agus Suherman, and Naufal Haidar Ahmada, “Budget Efficiency vs Public Service: A Critical Evaluation of Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 2025,” *Journal of Law and Economics* 4, no. 2 (November 30, 2025): 224–36, <https://doi.org/10.56347/jle.v4i2.376>.

³³ Bakti Setyadi, Sulaiman Helmi, and Syed Ismail Syed Mohamad, “Effectiveness and Efficiency of the State Revenue and Expenditure Budget Policy in South Sumatra: Islamic Perspective Study,” *IKONOMIKA* 8, no. 1 (May 22, 2023): 103, <https://doi.org/10.24042/febi.v8i1.16465>.

³⁴ Tasya Natalia, “Complete! Latest List of Ministries & Agencies Affected by Budget Efficiency Measures,” *CNBC Indonesia*, 2025.

³⁵ Daniel Hummel and Bevaola Kusumasari, “Local Government Financial Performance and Decentralization in Indonesia,” *State and Local Government Review*, September 2025, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0160323X251364379>.

³⁶ Ira Teja Sukma and Raden Budi Hendaris, “The Role of Audit Opinion in Enhancing the Influence of Local Revenue and Capital Expenditure on the Financial Performance of Local Governments in Indonesia,” *Indonesian Interdisciplinary Journal of Sharia Economics (IJSE)* 9, no. 1 (2026): 1664–80, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.31538/ijse.v9i1.9013>.

of 5.5% of the total APBD in the adjustment of the details of the allocation of Transfers to Regions (Transfer ke Daerah: TKD) contains the following details;

Table 2. Details of TKD allocation for Provinces/Regencies/Cities for Fiscal Year 2025 in accordance with Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 2025

TKD efficiency is derived from	Explanation	Efficiency amount
Underpayment of DBH	50% of the 2025 State Budget DBH The ceiling is reserved	IDR. 13.9 trillion
Physical DAK	Reserved from the connectivity and Food security sectors	IDR. 18.3 trillion
Special Funds	Reserved in the amount of	IDR. 0.2 trillion
DAU	Reserved from DAU SG in the field of Public works	IDR. 15.6 trillion
Special Autonomy	Following the allocation of DAU (3.25% of the DAU ceiling)	IDR. 0.5 trillion
Village Funds	Reserved from village funds for current Year incentives	IDR. 2 trillion

Source: Ministry of Finance Decree No. 29 of 2025, <https://perpajakan.ddtc.co.id/sumber-bukum/peraturan-pusat/keputusan-menteri-keuangan-29-tabun-2025>

Following up on Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 2025, the Minister of Finance issued a circular letter to the heads of ministries/agencies containing directives on expenditure savings in the implementation of the 2025 State Budget.³⁷ The Letter, numbered S-37/MK.02/2025, identifies at least 16 types of expenditure that are targeted for efficiency measures. These types of expenditures include: office stationery purchases, ceremonial activities, meetings and seminars, studies and analyses, education and training, honoraria for work or professional services, printing and souvenirs, building/vehicle rentals, application licenses, consulting services, government assistance, maintenance and repairs, business travel, equipment and machinery, infrastructure, and other expenditures.

In early 2025, the country experienced a deficit because spending reached Rp. 348.1 trillion, while revenue was only IDR. 316.9 trillion. This deficit was part of the government's strategy to accelerate development by issuing government bonds.³⁸ However, based on the report by the Minister of Finance, Sri Mulyani, at the end of March 2025, it was confirmed that state revenue had increased significantly to IDR 516.1 trillion (17.2% of the state budget target), consisting of IDR 400.1 trillion from taxes and IDR 115.9 trillion from non-tax state revenue (PNBP).³⁹ An increase of

³⁷ Ulfa Jamilatul Farida, "Budget Efficiency Policy In the Perspective of Sharia Economic Law."

³⁸ Mirekel Tjoa et al., "Public Sentiment Analysis on Budget Efficiency Measures in Prabowonomics: A 2025 Indonesian Economic Policy Study Using IndoBERT," in *2025 9th International Conference On Electrical, Electronics And Information Engineering (ICEEIE)* (IEEE, 2025), 1–6, <https://doi.org/10.1109/ICEEIE66203.2025.11252163>.

³⁹ Mario Rosario Wisnu Aji and Elisa Letizia, "Assesing The Efficiency Of Central Java's Regional Budget Realization Using Data Envelopment Analysis," *Equity: Jurnal Ekonomi* 13, no. 1 (April 12, 2025): 113–22, <https://doi.org/10.33019/equity.v13i1.434>.

around IDR 200 trillion occurred in just one month (March). Thus, the state budget recorded a primary balance surplus of IDR 17.5 trillion.⁴⁰

Argentina experienced an economic crisis in the mid-1990s, exacerbated by Brazil's 1999 devaluation, which negatively impacted Argentina's manufacturing industry.⁴¹ In 2001, Argentina's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell sharply by 8%, followed by a further decline of 10.9% that year. During the same period, the unemployment rate jumped from 14.3% to 21.5%, while the poverty rate increased from 38.3% to 57.5%.⁴² Argentina made many efforts to overcome its economic problems, including borrowing from foreign countries and the International Monetary Fund. The latest data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) show Argentina's loan transactions from May 1, 1984, to April 30, 2025, with total debt exceeding USD 45 billion. Moreover, Argentina had lost several billion dollars in international Arbitration disputes, particularly against American companies. This highlights the severity of the economic crisis that Argentina has been facing for a long time.⁴³

Argentina's political challenges began in 1930 and continued through 1976, when the country experienced no fewer than eight coup attempts, six of which were successful, most led by the military. This demonstrates a very high level of political instability and undermines foreign investors' confidence.⁴⁴ Previous administrations had accumulated inefficient regulations and bureaucracy. The previous government structure, with 18 ministries and 106 secretariats, was a significant budgetary burden. Furthermore, 80% of the tax agency's (AFIP) budget was allocated to employee salaries, while public services in the health and education sectors were neglected.⁴⁵ Inefficiency was further exacerbated by corruption and overlapping bureaucratic authority.⁴⁶ Given the urgency of the situation, budget-efficiency policies for Argentina are needed.

⁴⁰ Ghany Ellantia Wiguna and Khoirunurrofik Khoirunurrofik, "Political Budget Cycle Patterns and the Role of Coalition Parties in Shaping Indonesian Local Government Spending," *Asia-Pacific Journal of Regional Science* 5, no. 1 (February 6, 2021): 41–64, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s41685-020-00186-0>.

⁴¹ José Luis Oreiro et al., "Peripheral Financialization and Premature Deindustrialization: A Theory and the Case of Brazil (2003–2015)," *International Review of Economic Policy-Revista Internacional de Política Económica* 6, no. 2 (December 26, 2024): 38–58, <https://doi.org/10.7203/IREP.6.2.30131>.

⁴² Maria Antonieta Del Tedesco Lins, "Economic Policies Amid Political Instability in Latin America," in *Finance, Growth and Democracy: Connections and Challenges in Europe and Latin America in the Era of Permacrisis* (Cham: Springer Cham, 2025), 151–67, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-68475-3_10.

⁴³ Melih Kabayel, "Long-Term Descriptive Analysis of Argentina's Economy and 2001 Argentine Economic Crisis in the Context of Argentina's Economic Indicators and Public Finance Realizations" (Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2024), 15–40, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-5886-9_2.

⁴⁴ Simone Fari, "The 1990s Crisis During the Globalisation," in *The Age of Global Economic Crises* (London: Routledge, 2023), 105–26, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003388128-5>.

⁴⁵ Julio César Chamorro-Futinico, "Boom and Bust: Dynamics of Systemic Financial Instability in Financialized Emerging Economies," *Review of Political Economy* 37, no. 5 (October 20, 2025): 1757–88, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09538259.2025.2574918>.

⁴⁶ Jorge Garcia-Arias et al., "When Land Meets Finance in Latin America: Some Intersections between Financialization and Land Grabbing in Argentina and Brazil," *Sustainability* 13, no. 14 (July 20, 2021): 8084, <https://doi.org/10.3390/su13148084>.

The Argentina government under the leadership of Javier Miler submitted two proposals to Congress for approval, the first using a Decree or DNU (Decreto de Necesidades y Urgentinos), the second a massive law, officially called the "Ley de Bases y Puntos de Partida para la Libertad de los Argentinos," or the Constitution and Foundations for the Freedom of the Argentina People, with a total of 334 articles. DNU 70/2023 was approved and published in the state gazette on December 21, 2023, with the title "Bases Para la Reconstruccion de la Economia Argentina" or Basic Decree for the Reconstruction of the Argentine Economy.⁴⁷ This decree also serves as preliminary evidence of the implementation of budget efficiency policies in Argentina. In June, Congress approved and authorized the government to issue further deregulation decisions for one year, under the leadership of the newly appointed Minister of Deregulation and State Transformation, Federico Sturzenegger.⁴⁸

In the second year of President Javier Milei's presidency, the government implemented a budget-efficiency policy known as the "machine saw" model. This model is based on the concept of economic freedom and limited government. In February, Sturzenegger spearheaded the effort by instructing all ministers to review all laws and regulations under their authority and recommend comprehensive deregulation within 30 days.⁴⁹ For a country with nearly 300,000 laws, decrees, or resolutions, this is no easy task, but according to Sturzenegger, the government has already cut or modified 20% of them.⁵⁰ To address the stagnation and poverty that have plagued Argentina for four decades, it has been essential to eliminate regulations that hinder the country's productive forces.⁵¹ Therefore, the Argentine government has decided to implement a broad deregulation plan. Some regulations have been revoked because the decree comprises 366 articles, and many existing regulations have been revised or updated in the new regulatory framework. Labor deregulation under Decree No. 70 of 2023 provides various benefits for workers, including registration and safety guarantees, wage payments, conflict resolution, reduced worker contribution obligations, and the layoff process.⁵²

⁴⁷ Ramiro Álvarez Ugarte, "The Pro-Life Movement and the Fight for the Constitution in Argentina: Between Law and Transcendence," *Latin American Law Review*, no. 6 (February 1, 2021): 125–49, <https://doi.org/10.29263/lar06.2021.06>.

⁴⁸ Eduardo Zimmermann, "Caudillos, Democracy, and Constitutionalism in Mid Nineteenth-Century Argentina," *Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies* 26, no. 2 (May 3, 2020): 189–203, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14701847.2020.1789378>.

⁴⁹ Álvarez Ugarte, "The Pro-Life Movement and the Fight for the Constitution in Argentina: Between Law and Transcendence."

⁵⁰ Sebastian Galiani and Santiago Afonso, "Motives and Constraints in the Implementation of Argentina's 2017 Tax Reform&Nbsp;," 2025, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5663370>.

⁵¹ Edward L. Knudsen, "Escape from the 'Lost Decades?' Governance Challenges in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela," *Global Policy* 14, no. S4 (October 2023): 113–23, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.13279>.

⁵² Bernardo Ferrero and Philipp Bagus, "A 3D Look at Argentina: Deregulation, Dollarization, Deflation," *The Economists' Voice* 22, no. 1 (June 18, 2025): 151–60, <https://doi.org/10.1515/ev-2025-0010>.

The Law on the Starting Point for Freedom in Argentina, specifically Articles 2 and 3 of Chapter I, regulates reform, state reorganization, transformation of the legal structure, centralization, merger, and total or partial dissolution to improve state functions and achieve transparent, agile, efficient, effective, and high-quality public management.⁵³ The "shock therapy" model is an approach that cuts the number of ministries from 18 to 8. The eight ministries or agencies are the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Defense and Security, the Ministry of Deregulation and State Transformation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of International Trade and Worship, and the Ministry of Human Resources.⁵⁴

Chapter II on Privatization in Article 7 states: Companies whose entire or majority shares are owned by the state, as listed in Appendix I, which is part of this law, are hereby declared "subject to privatization" in accordance with the provisions and consequences listed in Chapters II and III of Law No. 23.969.⁵⁵ The privatization of state-owned enterprises reduces the burden and provides only partial data, not the entire state budget dataset.

The removal of energy and transportation subsidies led to a 300 percent increase in electricity rates and a 250 percent increase in public transportation fares, saving 6.5 billion dollars in one year.⁵⁶ A 76 percent cut in transfers to local governments and the implementation of a 4 percent GDP surplus by reducing social spending from 20 percent to 16 percent of GDP.⁵⁷

Presidential Prerogative Regarding the Establishment of Ministries in Indonesia and Argentina

Specifically, the prerogative rights of the President of Indonesia are limited to personnel matters (the appointment and dismissal of ministers), not to institutional matters such as the establishment, restructuring, or closure of a state ministry.⁵⁸ Regulatory changes in Law No. 61 of 2024, which amended Law No. 38 of 2008 on State Ministries and was ratified by President Joko Widodo on October 15, 2024,

⁵³ Geralda Luiza de Miranda, "Divergent Trends in Latin American Social Security: The Argentine, Brazilian and Cuban Cases in Comparative Perspective," *Revista Brasileira de Ciência Política* 44 (2025), <https://doi.org/10.1590/0103-3352.2025.44.283268en>.

⁵⁴ Diego Pando, "Public Policy-Making Process in Argentina," in *Handbook of Public Policy in Latin America* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2025), 442–57, <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781035310197.00037>.

⁵⁵ Chamber of Deputies. Article 7.

⁵⁶ Octavio Bertín et al., "Energy Subsidies: Conceptual Framework and Measurement for Distributional Impacts in Argentina," *Energy for Sustainable Development* 83 (December 2024): 101557, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esd.2024.101557>.

⁵⁷ Esteban Serrani and Mariano A. Barrera, "Renewable Energies in Argentina: The Challenge of Articulating the Energy Transition with the Economic Development Model," in *Energy Transitions in Latin America: Sustainable Development Goals Series* (Cham: Springer, 2023), 177–93, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37476-0_11.

⁵⁸ Isnawati Isnawati et al., "The Indonesian President's Prerogative Rights in the Appointment of Ministers After the Amendment to the 1945 Constitution," *Padjadjaran Jurnal Ilmu Hukum (Journal of Law)* 10, no. 2 (2023): 254–74, <https://doi.org/10.22304/pjih.v10n2.a6>.

have shifted this mechanism.⁵⁹ The amendment to Article 15 reads: "The total number of ministries established as referred to in Articles 12, 13, and 14 shall be determined in accordance with the needs of the administration of government by the president.⁶⁰ This means that the revision to Article 15 removes the previous limit of 34 ministries and replaces it with a provision stating that the number of ministries shall be determined by the president's needs.⁶¹

The latest revision of the Ministry Law grants the president unlimited authority to appoint ministers, which is highly ineffective considering Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 2025. Economist and public policy expert Achmad Nur Hidayat has responded critically to President Prabowo's instruction on budget cuts for ministries and agencies, as well as local governments. According to him, this policy may be ineffective because it does not address the root of the problem: an overly large and complex cabinet structure. Nur Hidayat also explained that an overly large cabinet structure causes budget inefficiency through inflated operational costs, employee allowances, and bureaucratic complexity.⁶²

Argentina also has prerogative rights. The legal basis for presidential authority in the executive branch is found in the Argentine Constitution, Chapter III on Executive Power, Article 99, paragraph (7), which reads: "*Nombra y remueve a los embajadores, ministros plenipotenciarios y encargados de negocios con acuerdo del Senado; por sí solo nombra y remueve al jefe de gabinete de ministros y a los demás ministros del despacho, los oficiales de su secretaría, los agentes consulares y los empleados cuyo nombramiento no está reglado de otra forma por esta Constitución*". On his own authority, he may appoint and dismiss the chief of the cabinet of ministers and ministers, employees of his secretariat, consular agents, and other officials whose appointment is not regulated in this Constitution.⁶³

Indonesia and Argentina both adhere to the presidential prerogative model in forming their cabinets. The legal argument related to the basic principles of ministry formation,⁶⁴ as outlined in the 1945 Constitution, the principle centres on the legality

⁵⁹ Moch Faisal Karim and Muhammad Kholid, "The Return of Authoritarian Neo-Liberalism in Indonesia?," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, July 30, 2025, 1–29, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2025.2529013>.

⁶⁰ Muhammad Jihadil Akbar, Dhia Al Uyun, and Ngesti Dwi Prasetyo, "Presidential Discretion and Ministerial Inflation," *Invest Journal of Sharia & Economic Law* 5, no. 1 (May 22, 2025): 137–63, <https://doi.org/10.21154/invest.v5i1.10540>.

⁶¹ Tunggal Anshari Setia Negara, Syahriza Alkohir Anggoro, and Imam Koeswahyono, "Indonesian Job Creation Law: Neoliberal Legality, Authoritarianism and Executive Aggrandizement Under Joko Widodo," *Law and Development Review* 17, no. 1 (February 26, 2024): 155–97, <https://doi.org/10.1515/ldr-2023-0022>.

⁶² Imam Sukamto, "Pemangkasan Anggaran Ala Prabowo Dinilai Tak Akan Berhasil Selama Kabinet Gemuk Dipertahankan," *Tempo.Co* (Jakarta, February 2025), <https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/pemangkasan-anggaran-ala-prabowo-dinilai-tak-akan-berhasil-selama-kabinet-gemuk-dipertahankan-1205013>.

⁶³ Sebastián Etchemendy and Germán Lodola, "The Rise of Public Sector Unions in the Twenty-First Century: A Theoretical, Mixed-Methods Approach with Evidence from Argentina," *Politics & Society* 52, no. 4 (December 14, 2024): 547–85, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292231205440>.

⁶⁴ Sudirman Sudirman, "Single Executive in the Indonesian Presidential System," *Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum Dan Keadilan* 11, no. 1 (April 4, 2023): 1–16, <https://doi.org/10.29303/ius.v11i1.962>.

of the executive-legislative branch and the goal of an efficient, transparent, and accountable state.⁶⁵ However, Law No. 61 of 2024 has altered this balance. Giving the president absolute power without oversight by the House of Representatives contradicts the spirit of Article 4 of the 1945 Constitution.⁶⁶ Furthermore, the cabinet's expansion will weaken the effectiveness of Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 2025. Meanwhile, although the Argentine constitution also grants broad prerogatives, the president uses them to pursue structural reform and present them as evidence of efficiency measures.

Implications of the Number of Indonesian Cabinet Positions on Budget Efficiency Policies

The formation of state ministries is regulated in Law No. 39 of 2008 on State Ministries. To map the development of the cabinet structure, the following table compares the number and composition of ministries across various administrations in Indonesia.

Table 3. Comparison of Cabinet Structures in Indonesia during Each Period

President	Cabinet	Number of Ministers
Soekarno	<i>Kabinet Presiden</i>	21 ministers
	<i>Kabinet Sjahrir I</i>	17 ministers
	<i>Kabinet Sjahrir II</i>	25 ministers
	Kabinet Sjahrir III	32 people
	<i>Kabinet Amir Sjarifuddin I and II</i>	34, 37 ministers
	<i>Kabinet Darurat</i>	12 ministers
	<i>Kabinet Hatta I, II</i>	17, 19 ministers
	Republik Indonesia Serikat	17 ministers
	<i>Kabinet Susanto</i>	10 ministers
	<i>Kabinet Halim</i>	15 ministers
	<i>Kabinet Natsir</i>	18 ministers
	<i>Kabinet Sukiman-Suwiryo</i>	20 ministers
	<i>Kabinet Wilopo</i>	18 ministers
	<i>Kabinet Ali Sastromijoyo I & II</i>	20, 25 ministers
	<i>Kabinet Burhanudin Harahap</i>	23 ministers
	<i>Kabinet Djuanda</i>	24 ministers
	<i>Kabinet Kerja I-IV</i>	33, 40, 60, and 66 ministers
	<i>Kabinet Dwikora 1-III</i>	110, 132, and 79 ministers
	<i>Kabinet Ampera I, II</i>	31, 24 ministers
Soeharto	Kabinet Pembangunan I-VII	24, 24, 32, 42, 44, 43, and 38 ministers
B.J. Habibie	<i>Kabinet Reformasi Pembangunan</i>	37 ministers
Abdurrahman	<i>Kabinet Persatuan Nasional</i>	36 ministers

⁶⁵ Febriansyah Ramadhan et al., "Towards a Structural Constitution: Contribution of Presidential Succession Law to the Constitution of Indonesia," *Legality : Jurnal Ilmiah Hukum* 33, no. 2 (July 30, 2025): 361–95, <https://doi.org/10.22219/ljih.v33i2.40203>.

⁶⁶ Muhammad Mutawalli, Zainal Amin Ayub, and Emmanuel Ibiyam Amah, "Polemic on the Dissolution of Ministries: An Overview of the Presidential System in Indonesia," *Litigasi* 24, no. 2 (October 31, 2023): 322–54, <https://doi.org/10.23969/litigasi.v24i2.10326>.

President	Cabinet	Number of Ministers
Wahid		
Megawati Soekarnoputri	<i>Kabinet Gotong Royong</i>	33 ministers
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono	<i>Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu I</i>	34 ministers, three ministerial-level officials
	<i>Kabinet Persatuan Indonesia II</i>	34 ministers, two ministerial-level officials, 18 deputy ministers
Joko Widodo	<i>Kabinet Kerja</i>	34 ministers, three deputy ministers
	<i>Kabinet Indonesia Maju</i>	34 ministers, four ministerial-level officials, 12 deputy ministers
Prabowo Subianto	<i>Kabinet Merah Putih</i>	48 ministers, 10 ministerial-level officials, 56 deputy ministers

Source: *Detik.com*, *Perbandingan Struktur Kabinet Presiden Indonesia dari Masa ke Masa*, <https://www.detik.com/bali/berita/d-7599942/perbandingan-struktur-kabinet-presiden-indonesia-dari-masa-ke-masa>

Following the enactment of Law No. 61 of 2024, President Prabowo formed the *Kabinet Merah Putih*, comprising 48 ministers, 56 deputy ministers, and 10 ministerial-level officials.⁶⁷ This is the largest number of ministers since the reform era. President Prabowo's reason for forming such a large cabinet is that he believes it is necessary to have more ministers than in previous administrations. He acknowledged that this number is significant but necessary, considering that Indonesia is a large nation with the fourth-largest population in the world and an area as large as Western Europe, comprising 27 countries, and that managing it alone would require 27 finance ministers and interior ministers.⁶⁸ Additionally, the formation of a national economic council and exceptional presidential staff by President Prabowo also requires legal legitimacy, whether through presidential regulations, presidential decrees, or laws, so that the resulting work programs and policies have legal force.⁶⁹ However, this policy should only be implemented if Indonesia is not currently implementing budget efficiency measures.

The increase in the number of ministries and agencies automatically requires more regulations to support the implementation of each institution's tasks and functions.⁷⁰ This phenomenon has two sides, namely positive and negative. On the positive side, more regulations enable the formulation of more specific rules that

⁶⁷ Muhnizar Siagian Muhnizar Siagian et al., "The Paradox of Budget Efficiency in Prabowo's Administration," *Journal of Government Science (GovSci): Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan* 6, no. 2 (July 31, 2025): 100–110, <https://doi.org/10.54144/govsci.v6i2.124>.

⁶⁸ Elita Rahmi et al., "Strengthening The Coordination Function of The Forestry Ministry: Legal Reform in The 'Merah Putih' Cabinet For Modern Bureaucracy," *Journal of Law and Legal Reform* 6, no. 4 (October 30, 2025): 2177–2218, <https://doi.org/10.15294/jllr.v6i4.22067>.

⁶⁹ Muhammad Haqiqi, Erland Ferdinansyah, and Kahlil Rida, "Meritokrasi Dan Pengaruh Partai Politik Dalam Jabatan Di Kementerian: Studi Analisis Kementerian Kabinet Merah Putih 2024-2029," *JAPHTN-HAN* 3, no. 2 (December 31, 2024): 149–66, <https://doi.org/10.55292/japhtnhan.v3i2.163>.

⁷⁰ Qurrata Ayuni, Fitra Arsil, and Alwi Alatas, "The Fall of Executive Power in Indonesia: The Need to Strengthen Legal Arrangements," *Revista de Investigações Constitucionais* 12, no. 1 (January 1, 2025): e500, <https://doi.org/10.5380/rinc.v12i1.94404>.

focus on problem-solving and clarify rights, obligations, and sanctions for violations. However, on the negative side, creating many regulations requires a large budget, which can lead to policy overlap.⁷¹ It creates opportunities for abuse of authority by establishing new special units subject to these regulations. The challenge for the Red and White Cabinet is to prove that a larger structure can produce better performance than the leaner cabinet structure of the previous era.⁷²

The number of ministries established by the president has significant implications for political, legal, and economic aspects.⁷³ In particular, economic factors have the most significant impact on the allocation of the state budget. Each additional ministry or agency directly increases operational budget requirements, including employee salaries and accommodation.⁷⁴ Additionally, there is the potential for unexpected costs, both in the performance of duties and outside of them, such as the maintenance of official vehicles or building repairs.⁷⁵ This illustration of costs applies to only one entity. If the number exceeds thirty units, the accumulated budget required for operations at the regional level becomes very large. Meanwhile, in the political and legal fields, although each ministry has clear duties and functions, there remains potential for policy overlap among ministries.⁷⁶

The composition of the cabinet may be influenced more by political compromise than by the government's functional needs.⁷⁷ This has become a point of contention: The *Kabinet Merah Putih* has implemented a zaken cabinet system based on meritocracy,⁷⁸ while the coalition cabinet has adopted a policy of reciprocity.⁷⁹ The Prabowo-Gibran cabinet consists of the following ministers:

⁷¹ Ary Hermawan, "Intra-Oligarchic Struggles and the Rise of Digital Attacks on Civil Society in Indonesia," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, June 5, 2025, 1–23, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2025.2505918>.

⁷² Rendy Wadipalapa, Poltak Nainggolan, and Riris Katharina, "Protecting Two Presidents: Legislative Decline in Indonesia's Post-2024 Election Transition," *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, April 7, 2025, 1–18, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2025.2484488>.

⁷³ Rizal Al Hamid, "Indonesia's Political Shifts: From Opposition to Coalition in 2014–2024 Elections," *Jurnal Ilmu Kepolisian* 19, no. 1 (April 24, 2025): 121–35, <https://doi.org/10.35879/jik.v19i1.620>.

⁷⁴ Aan Eko Widiarto et al., "The Authority Relationship of Central and Local Governments in Forming Laws and Regulations: Between Indonesia and Malaysia," *Legality: Jurnal Ilmiah Hukum* 33, no. 1 (February 16, 2025): 148–67, <https://doi.org/10.22219/ljih.v33i1.36629>.

⁷⁵ Alghifari Hafizh Matin et al., "The Transformation of Islamic Politics in the Prabowo Subianto Era: The Coalition of Islamic Party Organizations and Its Implications for Indonesian Democracy," *Jurnal Tapis: Jurnal Teropong Aspirasi Politik Islam* 22, no. 2 (December 26, 2025): 88–109, <https://doi.org/10.24042/tps.v22i2.28840>.

⁷⁶ Fikri Gali Fernando Holqi, "Legal Politics in the Indonesian Presidential System: How to Leverage Potential of Asset Forfeiture Bill for Corruption Eradication?," *Asia Social Issues* 18, no. 3 (March 21, 2025): e277404, <https://doi.org/10.48048/asi.2025.277404>.

⁷⁷ Roisa Nur Hanifah, Ratna Affifah Fatmahan, and Niken Ayu Melani, "Overlapping Powers in Merah Putih Cabinet: Case of Presidential Special Representative," *Journal of Transformative Governance and Social Justice* 3, no. 1 (June 13, 2025): 13–27, <https://doi.org/10.26905/j-tragos.v3i1.15217>.

⁷⁸ Neli Setiawati et al., "Between Shari'ah-Oriented Politics and Modern Bureaucracy: The Case of the Zaken Cabinet in Indonesia," *JISRAH: Jurnal Integrasi Ilmu Syariah* 6, no. 1 (April 30, 2025): 26, <https://doi.org/10.31958/jisrah.v6i1.15661>.

⁷⁹ Adam Muhshi, "The Construction of a Professional Presidential Cabinet Free from Political Party Monopoly: Opportunities and Challenges for the Red and White Cabinet" 4, no. 2 (2024): 185–203.

Table 4. Professional and political composition of the Red and White Cabinet ministries

Structure	Professional/ Independent	Politicians	Number
Coordinating Ministry	2	5	7
Technical Ministry	22	19	41
Ministries/Institutions not under the coordination of the Coordinating Minister	5	0	5

Source: *Mubammad Haqiqi et.al, Meritocracy and the Influence of Political Parties in Ministry Positions: An Alaytical Study of the Ministries in the 2024-2029 Merah Putih Cabinet*, <https://doi.org/10.55292/japhtnhan.v3i2.163>

The analysis of the composition of the *Kabinet Merah Putih* above reveals the characteristics of a *zakken* cabinet, which prioritizes the expertise and professionalism of its ministers. However, the characteristics of a coalition cabinet are also clearly evident from the large number of ministers who come from Political parties that support the president, especially the Golkar Party (8 people) and the Gerindra Party (5 people), both large parties and the president's leading parties. Meanwhile, the PDIP and Nasdem Parties, despite winning the most and second-most seats in the House of Representatives, did not secure any ministerial seats in this cabinet.⁸⁰ In addition, the formation of a coalition cabinet is evident in the careless selection of several ministers, some of whom are inexperienced and lack adequate expertise in their ministries. This will affect long-term political stability.⁸¹

The Impact of Budget Efficiency Policies on Cabinet Structure in Indonesia and Argentina

The Argentine Ministry of Economy stated in early 2024 that the country, the second-largest economy in South America, recorded a budget surplus of ARS 1.76 trillion (0.3% of GDP) over the year. On the other hand, the primary fiscal balance (excluding debt payments) showed a larger surplus of ARS 10.41 trillion, equivalent to 1.8% of GDP. In April 2025, the latest data showed that Argentina posted a trade surplus of \$204 million, with exports totaling USD 6.66 billion and imports totaling \$6.46 billion. The government statistics office published the data on Tuesday.⁸²

Although the Argentine government's policies have been praised and have been successful in some sectors, their negative impact is also complex. The most significant burden of this suffering falls on the working class. Poverty rose by 40% in 2023, climbing to 53% in the first half of 2024, with an estimated 6 million people still living in extreme poverty. Demand at food distribution centers and soup kitchens has surged nationwide. Meanwhile, Argentina's working-class citizens have been hit

⁸⁰ Mei Susanto et al., "Constitutional Repair through Opposition Reform: Designing the Right of the Opposition and Incentive Systems to Counter Democratic Deterioration in Indonesia," *Jambura Law Review* 7, no. 2 (2025): 583–632, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.33756/jlr.v7i2.29349>.

⁸¹ Dina Thalentaria Nainggolan and Nurdin Nurdin, "Analysis of the National Democratic Party's Refusal Joining the Prabowo-Gibran Coalition Government," *Journal La Sociale* 6, no. 4 (June 26, 2025): 1206–22, <https://doi.org/10.37899/journal-la-sociale.v6i4.2247>.

⁸² Humberto Debat, "The Collapse of Argentine Science Under Javier Milei: One Year of Unprecedented Defunding," *Infonomy* 3, no. 1 (March 21, 2025), <https://doi.org/10.3145/infonomy.25.007>.

by the elimination of energy and public transportation subsidies, leading to skyrocketing bills.⁸³ In his first speech as president, Milei managed expectations. Throughout his campaign, Milei did not downplay the short-term impact of his economic reforms, stating that the country's situation would deteriorate before it improved. There are some signs that the most painful phase of adjustment may be over. Consumer spending and manufacturing are showing signs of improvement. In September 2024, wage growth outpaced inflation for the sixth consecutive month. Overall, this year's recession is expected to lead to 5% economic growth in 2025, according to the World Bank.⁸⁴ A comparison between Indonesia and Argentina shows that presidential prerogatives can be used to adjust cabinet structures, thereby enhancing budget efficiency. However, the approaches used are different. Indonesia tends to adjust the cabinet structure based on national political and legal considerations, whereas Argentina grants greater authority to the executive through special laws.⁸⁵ The implication of using these prerogative rights is the need to balance budget efficiency with government accountability. Granting the executive too much authority without strict oversight can increase the risk of abuse of power and weaken the legislative function. Therefore, structural cabinet reforms must be carried out transparently, with public participation and systematic oversight, to ensure that budget efficiency goals are achieved without undermining democratic principles. Thus, the president's prerogative affects the cabinet's posture on budget efficiency policy. However, its use must be balanced by strong checks and balances to maintain the government's integrity and effectiveness.⁸⁶

The Ideal Model for Restricting the Structure of the Indonesian Cabinet for Budget Efficiency Policies

Budget efficiency in government is not simply a matter of cutting spending, but rather of using that money as effectively as possible to maximize results at the lowest possible cost. In other words, budget efficiency is about using money wisely to maximize results and avoid waste. If the government can do this, its work will improve, waste will be reduced, and the public will have greater trust in it. The principle of good governance is the foundation on which the government works well and remains accountable. One important part of bureaucratic reform is the efficient

⁸³ Daniel Lewis Wuebben, Duilio Lorenzo Calcagno, and Maclane Henry, "Planning for Energy Justice? A Discourse Analysis of Energy Planning and Climate Policy in South America," *Applied Energy* 393 (September 2025): 126041, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2025.126041>.

⁸⁴ Ernesto Gallo, *The Era of Authoritarian Neoliberalism* (Leiden, The Netherlands: BRILL, 2025), <https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004523630>.

⁸⁵ R. Dwi Tjahja K. Wardhono, Dian Puji Nugraha Simatupang, and Nadhia Shalehanti, "Legal Reforms in Indonesia's Financial Sector on Institutional Relations between Bank Indonesia and the Government," *Hasanuddin Law Review* 11, no. 1 (January 21, 2025): 57, <https://doi.org/10.20956/halrev.v11i1.5438>.

⁸⁶ Ante Malinar and Gabriela de Carvalho, "International Organisations as Policy Bricoleurs: An Analysis of the World Bank's Healthcare Financing Recommendations for Argentina and Croatia," *Contemporary Politics* 31, no. 1 (January 18, 2025): 86–109, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2024.2314217>.

use of the budget. Good governance is a guiding principle emphasizing transparency, public involvement, efficiency, accountability, and the rule of law.⁸⁷

A model is presented that limits presidential power in determining the structure of ministries. The ideal number of ministries, according to the author, is detailed as follows:

Table 5. List Ideal Cabinet Ministers

Ministries in the <i>Kabinet Merah Putih</i>	Proposed Cabinet Structure
Ministry of State Secretariat	Ministry of State Secretariat
Ministry of Defense	Ministry of Defense
Ministry of Home Affairs	Ministry of Home Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Finance	Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources	Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources
Ministry of Law	Ministry of Law and Human Rights
Ministry of Human Rights	
Ministry of Agriculture	Ministry of Agriculture
Ministry of Industry	Ministry of Industry and Trade
Ministry of Trade	
Ministry of Environment	Ministry of Environment and Forestry
Ministry of Forestry	
Ministry of Health	Ministry of Health
Ministry of Transportation	Ministry of Transportation
Ministry of Manpower	Ministry of Manpower
Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries	Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries
Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy	Ministry of Cooperatives, Small, Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, and Creative Economy
Ministry of Cooperatives	
Ministry of Small, Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises	
Ministry of Social	Ministry of Social Services and Public Housing
Ministry of Public Housing	
Ministry of Public Works	Ministry of Public Works and Spatial Planning
Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning	Ministry of Agrarian Affairs
Ministry of Religious Affairs	Ministry of Religious Affairs
Ministry of Hajj and Umrah	
Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs	Ministry of Communication and Information Technology
Ministry of Education	Ministry of Education, Culture, and Research
Ministry of Culture	

⁸⁷ Max Nagel, “From Vulnerability to Stability? Latin American Strategies to Govern Financial Subordination,” *Competition & Change* 29, no. 2 (April 3, 2025): 163–82, <https://doi.org/10.1177/10245294241313003>.

Ministries in the <i>Kabinet Merah Putih</i>	Proposed Cabinet Structure
Ministry of Higher Education, Science, and Technology	
Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises	Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises
Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection	Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection
Ministry of State Apparatus Empowerment and Bureaucratic Reform	Ministry of State Apparatus Empowerment and Bureaucratic Reform
State Minister for Youth and Sports Affairs	State Minister for Youth and Sports Affairs

Source: Compiled by the author based on several references

In terms of state administration, budget efficiency policies must account for the structural nature of state institutions. The *Kabinet Merah Putih* came under scrutiny when Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 2025 was issued, as many people were concerned that appointing so many presidential aides would strain the state budget. Celios projected a potential budget increase of up to IDR 1.95 trillion over the next term, excluding the cost of purchasing goods for the construction of office facilities or buildings.⁸⁸ Therefore, the author will present an example of a model for limiting the president's power in determining the structure of ministries: First, the Presidential Agency Law must regulate the merger of the Cabinet Secretariat, the Military Presidential Secretariat, the Presidential Secretariat, the Presidential Household and Protocol, and the Presidential Spokesperson into a single integrated Ministry of State Secretariat. The conclusion is that the state ministry falls under the Presidential Agency Law.⁸⁹

Second, the Presidential Agency Law must stipulate the abolition of the Coordinating Ministry for Institutional Affairs and the position of Coordinating Minister, as the Coordinating Ministry has, in addition to burdening the state budget, also hindered bureaucratic efficiency within the cabinet. The problem is that ministers must be able to connect directly with the president and vice president, but the president and vice president must first go through the coordinating minister.⁹⁰ The coordinating ministry and the position of coordinating minister should be removed from the cabinet because, from an authority perspective, the coordinating minister's only task is to hold coordination meetings. The coordinating minister has no authority to make any decisions, except to coordinate and then report the results of the coordination to the president. The position of coordinating minister is still considered necessary by presidents from the old order, the new order, and the current reform era. Therefore, this position must be abolished so that it does not become part of the state convention, thereby making it an obligation binding on

⁸⁸ Liam Gammon, "Prabowo's Hegemonic Presidency and Its Discontents," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 61, no. 3 (September 2, 2025): 333–56, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2025.2588820>.

⁸⁹ Saifulloh et al., "Reconstruction of Restrictions on the President's Power in Determining the Posture of Ministries in the Indonesian Government System."

⁹⁰ Victor Imanuel W. Nalle, "Deciphering Developmentalism: A Legal-Economic Examination of Indonesia's Administration," *Law and Development Review*, May 5, 2025, <https://doi.org/10.1515/ldr-2025-0010>.

every president to implement it in their respective cabinets. Therefore, the president and vice president must coordinate their ministers effectively to assume the role previously carried out by the coordinating minister.

Third, the substance of the Presidential Agency Law must regulate the abolition of the position of deputy minister. The deputy minister is one of the positions established by the president, as outlined in Article 10 of the Ministry of State.⁹¹ The explanation in Article 10 clarifies that the deputy minister is a career official, not a member of the cabinet. However, after Constitutional Court Decision No. 79/PUU-IX/2011 invalidated the explanation of Article 10 of the State Ministry Law, Presidential Decree No. 60 of 2012 on the Vice President was issued, which created ambiguity.⁹² The Presidential Decree states that the position of deputy minister is neither a structural official position nor a cabinet position. Strangely, deputy ministers are appointed by the president without being proposed by ministers. The reason the position of Deputy Minister (Wakil Menteri or Wamen) must be abolished is because the organizational structure of the state ministry is unclear as it is not in line with the provisions of Article 9 of the Law on State Ministries, which states that the organizational structure of a state ministry consists of a leader, namely the minister, the Secretary General as the assistant leader, the Director General as the executor of primary tasks, the Inspector General as the supervisor, and so on.⁹³

Fourth, establish a strategic position model for the vice president. The position of vice president in the Indonesian constitution should not be subordinate to that of the president.⁹⁴ Ironically, despite being the second-highest executive official, the vice president's authority is less specific and less inherent than that of ministers.⁹⁵ Unlike in Argentina, the vice president holds an important position not only in the executive branch but also as the head of the Senate.⁹⁶ Strengthening the vice president's strategic role could shift some of the coordinating functions currently assigned to the

⁹¹ Retno Saraswati and Hasyim Asy'ari, "Legal Analysis of Constitutional Court Decision No. 79/PUU-IX/2011 on State Ministries in the Context of the Abolition of the Position of Deputy Minister," *Diponegoro Law Journal* 6, no. 7 (2017): 5, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.14710/dlj.2017.15683>.

⁹² Muhammad Safaat Gunawan et al., "Constitutional Analysis of the Prohibition on Dual Deputy Ministerial Positions in Indonesia," *Jurnal Sultan: Riset Hukum Tata Negara*, December 12, 2025, 66–77, https://doi.org/10.35905/sultan_htn.v4i1.15296.

⁹³ Sonia Sekar Sari et al., "Disregarding the Constitutional Court Decision Concerning the Prohibition of Concurrent Deputy Minister Positions," *Jurnal Konstitusi* 20, no. 4 (December 1, 2023): 604–21, <https://doi.org/10.31078/jk2043>.

⁹⁴ Thomas B. Pepinsky, "Cleavages, Institutions, and Democracy in Indonesia: The 2024 Elections in Comparative Perspective," *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 44, no. 3 (December 12, 2025): 345–65, <https://doi.org/10.1177/18681034251349467>.

⁹⁵ Ramadhan et al., "Towards a Structural Constitution: Contribution of Presidential Succession Law to the Constitution of Indonesia."

⁹⁶ Marcelo Camerlo, Andrés Malamud, and Anabella Molina, "Fluid Paths to the Cabinet in Federal Presidential Systems: Argentina 1983–2020," *Regional & Federal Studies* 35, no. 3 (May 27, 2025): 391–415, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2022.2144255>.

coordinating ministers. Thus, the current seven coordinating minister positions could be reduced to three or four.⁹⁷

According to Muwaffiq Jufri's research, successful regulation revision requires both formal and scientific legitimacy.⁹⁸ The first step in the process is formal legitimacy, through the House of Representatives (DPR) and the President, in enacting laws; in this case, the Presidential Agency Law, which limits the President's authority to determine the structure of state ministries. Second, scientific legitimacy, so that the Presidential Agency Law is made systematically, comprehensively, and not filled with the political interests of individuals or groups. Books, journals, research, seminars, even constitutional drafting debate competitions and quiz contests are needed for students and university students, as well as for law-making institutions (the DPR and the President) in drafting the Presidential Agency Law.

Conclusion

The fundamental factors behind budget efficiency policies in Indonesia and Argentina reveal similar fiscal motives, but differ in their implementation approaches. Indonesia's efficiency policy emerged in response to the country's 2024 budget deficit (approximately Rp. 507.8 trillion). It increased accumulated debt (Rp. 8,680.12 trillion as of November 2024), prompting the government to issue Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 2025, which requires a reduction in operational spending of IDR 306.69 trillion (including IDR 256.1 trillion from ministries/agencies and IDR 50.59 trillion from regional transfers). Efficiency is directed towards funding the government's priority programs. However, excessive allocation and a large number of cabinet members could pose counterproductive risks to long-term investment in productive sectors such as education, health, and infrastructure.

On the other hand, Argentina chose the path of “shock therapy” through an emergency economic decree in early 2023 in the context of a prolonged economic crisis, with debt and financing from the IMF realized through deregulation, bureaucratic reform, and drastic cuts in the number of ministries as well as the merger or dissolution of ministries/agencies to achieve efficient public management. The main difference lies in the readiness for structural reform. Argentina implemented rapid, centralized, and radical changes, while Indonesia preferred budget cuts without comparable organizational restructuring, even though both systems give broad authority to the president.

Based on these issues, concise policy recommendations emphasize a combination of lessons from abroad and domestic adjustments. First, the Indonesian

⁹⁷ Ali Imran Nasution et al., “Relevansi Peran Kementerian Koordinator Dalam Sistem Presidensial: Studi Komparatif Dan Rekomendasi Kebijakan Untuk Sistem Pemerintahan Indonesia,” *Perspektif Hukum* 25, no. 1 (June 11, 2025): 146–73, <https://doi.org/10.30649/ph.v25i1.351>.

⁹⁸ Muwaffiq Jufri, “Urgensi Amandemen Kelima Pada Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 Terkait Hak Dan Kebebasan Beragama,” *Jurnal HAM* 12, no. 1 (April 22, 2021): 123, <https://doi.org/10.30641/ham.2021.12.123-140>.

government can learn from countries that have implemented budget-efficiency policies, such as Argentina, which has merged related ministries. However, adjustments must remain in line with the national context to avoid negative impacts on productive sectors. Second, the establishment of a presidential office through legislation to strengthen the legitimacy and governance of the executive branch, which includes provisions such as limiting the number of ministries (a maximum of 24 ministers or a return to the previous maximum limit), the merger and simplification of secretariats, the elimination of institutional coordination ministries and non-essential deputy minister positions, and the structuring of a strategic role for the vice president. Therefore, budget efficiency policies must be implemented in Indonesia, including structural reform measures carried out in accordance with the principles of transparency, public participation, and systematic oversight, ensuring that budget efficiency objectives are achieved without sacrificing democracy or the continuity of long-term development.

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